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The global economic and financial crisis has put 
the spotlight on the macroeconomic imbalances 
that had built up in a number of Member States 
during the decade. It has also underscored the 
shortcomings of economic policy making and 
policy coordination in the EU, and especially in 
the euro area. The Commission's resulting 
determination to play its part in redressing 
previous coordination failures was embodied in 
its Communication of 30 June on 'Enhancing 
economic policy coordination for stability, 
growth and jobs – Tools for stronger EU 
economic governance'. This outlined the main 
requirements for an overhaul of the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) and proposed important 
extensions of EU economic surveillance into a 
previous blind spot, namely the area of 
macroeconomic imbalances. 
Since then the Commission has consulted widely 
on its proposals, notably with other EU 
institutions, national authorities and within the 
forum of the Task Force on Economic 
Governance chaired by President Van Rompuy. 
This dialogue has enabled the Commission to 
draw up a package of concrete legislative 
proposals designed to address the most urgent 
policy priorities in economic governance. The 
package was adopted by the College of 
Commissioners on 29 September and features 
four major building blocks: 
1. A stronger Stability and Growth Pact 
Important shortcomings in fiscal policy 
coordination at the EU level have been revealed 
by the crisis and by the toll it has taken on 
Member States' public finances. The 
Commission hence proposes to reinforce 
Member States' compliance with the SGP and to 
deepen fiscal policy coordination. Overall, the 
proposals aim to monitor debt developments 
more closely and to address excessive debt 
levels more seriously than in the past by setting a 
clear benchmark for defining a satisfactory pace 
of debt reduction. 
On the so-called 'preventive arm' of the SGP, the 
proposals are partly motivated by the difficulties 
in identifying in real time how strong and 
sustainable a Member State's underlying fiscal 
position is. Related challenges include assessing 
correctly the business cycle but also gauging in 
how far fiscal revenues are temporarily buoyed 
by asset bubbles. Boom in asset prices caused 
many Member States to enter the crisis with 
weak underlying positions despite years of 
strong economic growth. As a more prudent 
expenditure rule, the Commission therefore 
proposes that Member States that have not yet 
reached their budgetary medium-term objective 
(MTO), which typically is for a balanced budget, 
should not increase expenditure faster than a 
prudent average rate of medium-term economic 
growth. Exceptions to this rule would be 
permitted only if Member States introduce the 
revenue measures necessary to fund this higher 
expenditure. That way, any "surprise" revenue is 
allocated to debt reduction by default.  
The reform package also contains changes to the 
'corrective arm' of the SGP, the Excessive 
Deficits Procedure (EDP). Too many countries 
had debt levels far in excess of the 60% ceiling 
when entering the crisis. We hence propose to 
place more weight on the debt criterion in the 
decision over whether to launch an EDP by 
taking into account both the level of debt and its 
recent changes. At the same time, the proposals 
foresee taking into consideration the 
characteristics of a country's debt stock, such as 
its maturity profile, implicit liabilities and 
guarantees, as well as the behaviour of private 
debt.  
2. Stronger national fiscal frameworks 
Member States' fiscal policy structures and 
processes help shape their budgetary decisions. 
Experience has shown that well-designed fiscal 
frameworks are key to achieving pre-determined 
budgetary objectives. For this reason the 
Commission's proposals identify a number of 
fiscal framework features relating to accounting 
and statistical issues, as well as forecasting and 
budgeting practices, which are indispensable to 
ensure a minimum level of quality and 
consistency with the EMU framework. The 
purpose of the corresponding draft Directive is 
to encourage those Member States where 
institutional weaknesses have interfered with 
their ability to ensure effective economic 
governance to upgrade their fiscal frameworks. 
Obviously, many other Member States already 
satisfy the proposed requirements.  
3. Tackling macroeconomic imbalances 
The third building block of the legislative 
package foresees a broadening of economic 
surveillance beyond fiscal policy to prevent and 
correct macroeconomic and competitiveness 
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imbalances in the euro area and the EU. Too 
little attention was paid previously to 
phenomena such as strong credit growth, asset 
bubbles and large and persistent current account 
and competitiveness divergences. The case of 
Spain serves as a good illustration of a country 
that showed a relatively solid fiscal position for 
much of the pre-crisis decade, but was caught 
out by other macroeconomic imbalances such as 
worsening competitiveness and a housing market 
bubble, the unwinding of which then fed back 
into a fiscal deterioration. To broaden 
surveillance, the Commission proposes to put in 
place an alert mechanism to identifying Member 
States with potentially problematic levels of 
macroeconomic imbalances. This mechanism 
consists of a scoreboard of economic and 
financial indicators. The numerical results of the 
scoreboard will be supplemented by expert 
analysis in order to draw up a list of countries at 
risk of experiencing harmful imbalances. All 
such Member States would then be subject to in-
depth country reviews in order to ascertain the 
level of threat posed by their respective types of 
disequilibria. 
If imbalances are perceived to be severe or 
jeopardising the functioning of EMU, the 
Member State concerned will be subject to an 
'Excessive Imbalance Procedure' (EIP). This will 
involve stepped-up surveillance centred around a 
remedial action plan put forward by the Member 
State in response to country-specific policy 
recommendations issued by the Council. 
Progress reporting and implementation 
monitoring will accompany the process of 
correcting the imbalances. If a euro-area-
Member State fails repeatedly to act in 
compliance with the Council recommendations 
to address excessive macroeconomic 
imbalances, it will have to pay a yearly fine, 
until the Council establishes that corrective 
action has been taken.  
4. Clear sanctions to aid compliance 
The above improvements to the surveillance 
framework will be backed up by financial 
sanctions for euro-area Member States that will 
be applied in a graduated, resolute and timely 
manner. Regarding the preventive arm of the 
Pact, a Member State that is making insufficient 
progress towards budgetary consolidation will be 
required to lodge an interest-bearing deposit 
with the Commission which will be returned 
with the interest accrued on it once the situation 
giving rise to it has come to an end. For the 
corrective arm, a Member State that enters an 
EDP will be required to lodge a non-interest-
bearing deposit with the Commission which will 
be returned upon correction of the excessive 
deficit. By contrast, a Member State that does 
not comply with the Council recommendations 
to correct its excessive deficit will be required to 
pay a fine. Fines will also be used as tool of last 
resort in the Commission's proposed surveillance 
framework on economic imbalances. 
The proposed sanctions only extend to euro-
area-Member States as their policies have 
greater spill-over effects within EMU and there 
exist stronger policy constraints in a monetary 
union. However, a 'second stage' of enforcement 
is envisaged in the future, which would 
introduce the possibility of suspending or 
cancelling current and future financial 
appropriations from the EU budget for all EU 
Member States in case of non-compliance under 
the corrective arm of the SGP (not its preventive 
arm, nor the EIP). The required legal changes to 
the underlying Regulations could be 
incorporated in the Commission's 2011 
proposals for the next financial perspectives, and 
these would help generate greater fiscal 
discipline within the entire EU. It is still too 
early to say which parts of the EU budget would 
be affected, but the aim is to achieve the widest 
possible coverage, to ensure true equality, 
fairness and effectiveness. 
Towards an integrated 'European Semester'  
Besides the recent Commission legislative 
proposals, steps have already been taken to 
strengthen policy coordination in the EU. On 
7 September, the Ecofin Council endorsed plans 
for a ‘European Semester’ which implies that, as 
of next year, policy surveillance will be 
conducted in an integrated and simultaneous 
fashion, drawing together reporting and 
assessment strands under the Stability and 
Growth Pact, on macroeconomic imbalances and 
on structural reforms. The European Semester 
will apply to all the elements of economic 
surveillance, including policies to ensure fiscal 
discipline, macroeconomic stability, and to 
foster growth. The processes under the SGP and 
the EU2020 strategy will thereby be aligned in 
timing while remaining formally separated. The 
alignment will help avoid policy inconsistencies 
and will strengthen policy synergies.  
 
       *    *    * 
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Financial sector improves but still volatile  
Looking at the economic outlook for the euro 
area in the second half of 2010, one of the most 
tumultuous periods of the economic crisis 
continues to reverberate. The extraordinary risk 
aversion of sovereign debt markets in May has 
receded although sovereign bond and CDS 
spreads remain high and volatile for some euro-
area Member States. The fall in sovereign 
spreads since May has been supported by 
Greece's progress on budgetary consolidation 
and structural reforms. In August, a joint mission 
by the European Commission, the ECB and the 
IMF concluded that the Greek government's 
economic adjustment program had made a 
strong start led by vigorous implementation of 
the fiscal programme and impressive structural 
reforms. But obviously resolute implementation 
of the programme has to be maintained to ensure 
lasting success.  
Some improvements have also been visible in 
the euro-area banking sector, where July's stress 
tests have helped to assuage balance sheet 
concerns. However, problems related to a lack of 
liquidity and difficulties in tapping wholesale 
funding have not disappeared altogether.  
Positive news for the short-term outlook 
Mixed developments in the financial sector 
contrast with the generally positive 
developments for the real economy of the euro 
area, which, while still fragile, is recovering at a 
faster pace than previously envisaged. 
According to our interim economic forecast 
published on 13 September, annual GDP growth 
in 2010 is now projected at 1.7% in the euro 
area. This represents a sizeable upward revision 
compared to the spring forecast (0.9% for the 
euro area), reflecting mainly a better-than-
expected outcome in the first half of the year on 
the back of an export-led industrial rebound. The 
improved outlook also reflects signs of a 
favourable rebalancing of growth towards 
domestic demand. At the same time, revisions to 
the inflation forecast are minor, as the first half 
of the year came broadly in line with 
expectations. 
Subdued Recovery 
Looking further ahead, however, risks remain 
elevated, and the recovery can be expected to be 
fairly uneven and relatively moderate. As argued 
in previous editions of the Quarterly Report on 
the Euro Area, recoveries from major financial 
and banking crises tend to be sluggish as the 
economy undergoes important structural 
changes. As analysed in this issue of the Report, 
a force which could weigh on the short- to 
medium-term growth prospects is the ongoing 
balance sheet adjustment process in the euro-
area corporate sector. Previous episodes of 
corporate balance sheet adjustment have been 
associated with sizeable negative 
macroeconomic consequences, including weak 
GDP growth due to lower investment rates and 
falls in labour compensation. From a policy 
perspective, it will therefore be crucial to 
counteract these dampening forces on growth, 
which are nonetheless necessary for a successful 
reduction of imbalances, by frontloading 
growth-enhancing reforms.  
While corporate balance sheets are a source of 
concern for the recovery, the situation appears 
more favourable on the household side. Our 
assessment of house price developments 
presented in this report reveals a far smaller 
degree of overvaluation in the euro area than in 
the US at the end of 2008, and a smaller 
remaining degree of overvaluation by the end of 
2009, notwithstanding considerable 
heterogeneity between Member States.  
One important aspect of the short-term outlook 
is the likely unevenness of the upswing to come. 
At the heart of this divergence of growth lie the 
accumulated macroeconomic imbalances in 
some Member States. Competitiveness and 
current account divergences have aggravated the 
exposure of the euro area to the crisis. These call 
for a rebalancing of the strength of domestic 
demand relative to output in those Member 
States which have accumulated a large external 
debt but also in those that run large current 
account surpluses. Signs of relatively buoyant 
domestic demand in economies such as 
Germany and balance sheet adjustment in part of 
the Southern periphery are encouraging in this 
respect. But the rebalancing process will take 
time and be associated with a period of 
divergence in growth within the euro area.  
According to the analysis of past episodes of 
current account rebalancing presented in this 
Quarterly Report, adjusting to external deficits 
generally means a period of sluggish growth and 
rising unemployment. However, this can be 
mitigated if prices and wages respond 
appropriately and competitiveness is improved. 
The issue is particularly critical in EMU where 
the nominal exchange rate of the euro cannot 
cater for the particular adjustment need of 
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individual Member States. So far, there have 
been only limited signs of rebalancing of prices 
and competitiveness across the euro area and 
further adjustment is clearly needed here.  
Looking further into the specific situation of 
Greece, the analysis in this Quarterly Report 
sheds some light on some of the structural 
supply-side factors that may determine the 
length and the cost of the current account 
adjustment. Here, we find encouraging pre-
conditions for a rebalancing of supply towards 
the export sector in the sense that a high 
proportion of companies are being involved in – 
and therefore responsive to - export activity. 
This suggests that competitiveness-boosting 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
reforms in the country are likely to pay off all 
the more quickly.  
While considerable challenges still await us in 
coping with - and adapting to - the crisis, one 
should not disregard the silver lining to this 
cloud. Provided that the current reform 
momentum is maintained, the Great Recession 
will have led to major policy changes at national 
level and a substantial reshaping of the EU 
policy coordination framework. 
 
MARCO BUTI 
DIRECTOR-GENERAL 
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The global economic and financial crisis has been 
associated with significant adjustments of private-
sector balance sheets. Whereas economists’ 
attention has generally focused on households’ 
efforts to deleverage in the wake of falling house 
prices, there is also evidence that corporations 
have been going through an important adjustment 
process. This focus section presents an analysis of 
past balance sheet adjustment processes in the 
corporate sector of advanced economies. It 
discusses both the implications of the adjustment 
for the real economy and its likely causes. On the 
basis of the analysis of past trends, it then assesses 
potential risks to the recovery posed by the 
ongoing corporate deleveraging process in the 
euro area.  
I.1. Assessing the macroeconomic effects 
of changes in corporate balance 
sheets  
Corporate balance sheets depict the structure of 
assets as well as liabilities such as debt and equity 
holdings. The structure of the balance sheets of 
individual corporations responds to changing 
economic and financial conditions, including 
growth prospects, asset prices, taxation and 
interest rates. For example, large shocks to asset 
prices may significantly alter balance sheets, 
thereby triggering a balance sheet adjustment 
process. In normal times, changes in balance 
sheets of individual firms have little effect on the 
economy. Occasionally, when the economy is hit 
by major shocks, the sum of these micro-
transformations may, however, be sufficiently 
large to have significant macroeconomic 
consequences.  
Under very strict assumptions (perfect capital 
markets, no bankruptcy costs and a neutral tax 
system), changes in the structure of balance sheets 
should leave the value of the firm unaffected and 
should not influence output decisions (Modigliani 
and Miller 1958). (1) When these assumptions do 
not hold, however, the structure of balance sheets 
depends on economic conditions and firms' 
financial decisions can no more be separated from 
their output decision. Modern finance theory has 
emphasised the possible interactions between 
balance-sheet structure and the non-financial side 
of the economy when capital markets and 
information are imperfect. (2) In a world of 
imperfect access to equity and debt markets, 
deleveraging may require a period of cost cutting 
aimed at raising internal funds. This paves the 
way for a possible impact of major episodes of 
balance-sheet restructuring on GDP growth. 
Measuring balance sheet adjustment at the 
macroeconomic level 
National accounts provide a range of data to 
analyse developments in corporate balance sheets 
at the macroeconomic level. In particular, 
Eurostat’s financial accounts include a balance 
sheet section which makes it possible to track 
developments in a number of aggregate indicators 
for the corporate sector, including debt to equity 
ratios, debt to GDP ratios and liquidity measures.  
                                                        
(1) Modigliani, F. and M. Miller (1958), ‘The cost of capital, 
corporation finance and the theory of investment’, American 
Economic Review, Vol. 48, pp. 261-97. 
(2) See for instance Hubbard, G.L. (1998), ‘Capital-market 
imperfections and investment’, Journal of Economic 
Literature, Vol. 36 (March), pp. 193–225. 
The global economic crisis is associated with a significant adjustment of corporate balance sheets. This focus 
section presents an analysis of past episodes of large balance sheet adjustments in the corporate sector of 
advanced economies. Based on a sample of 31 episodes, adjustment is found to last on average 8 years. It is 
associated with sizeable macroeconomic consequences, including losses in GDP growth and strong falls in 
investment. Moreover, balance sheet adjustment translates into weaker growth of the wage bill, which in turn 
weighs on domestic demand and economic growth, a channel not so far explored in the economic literature. 
Case studies from Japan and Germany together with an econometric analysis show that adjustment episodes 
can be triggered by corporate over-indebtedness, stock market declines, business cycle downturns and negative 
shocks to GDP growth. Moreover, a deterioration of financial intermediation as well as changes in the tax 
system may cause or prolong adjustments. Due to its likely impact on risk attitudes and on the growth potential, 
the current crisis is likely to be associated with significant balance sheet adjustment weighing on economic 
growth, in particular in euro-area countries with large corporate debt overhang. Fixing banks’ balance sheets 
and frontloading growth reforms under the Europe 2020 initiative will lessen the negative consequences of the 
adjustment.   
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area III/2010 
 
- 10 -
These stock data have their counterparts in flow 
data, particularly in income accounts for the 
corporate sector. In this focus section, episodes of 
significant balance sheet adjustment at the 
macroeconomic level are identified by large and 
persistent increases in a variable extracted from 
income accounts: corporate net lending or 
borrowing (NLB). Corporate NLB measures 
corporations’ net needs in terms of external 
finance (if negative) or, alternatively, their net 
financial investments (if positive). A persistent 
rise in NLB marks corporations’ efforts to raise 
internal funds in order to restructure balance 
sheets either by reducing debt or by accumulating 
financial assets.  
Balance sheet restructuring does not necessarily 
imply an increase in NLB. For instance, 
deleveraging can be achieved by raising new 
funds on equity markets. In a world of integrated 
global capital markets, such an operation should 
have only limited short-term effects on real 
activity. In contrast, deleveraging achieved by 
raising internal funds will have a measurable 
short-term impact on demand. NLB is indeed the 
difference between savings and investment (see 
Box I.1 for a description of the underlying 
accounting). An increase in corporate NLB can 
therefore be achieved either by raising corporate 
savings or by reducing corporate investment. In 
both cases the impact on demand is negative, 
either directly via lower corporate investment or 
indirectly via a cut in the corporate income 
distributed to workers and capital holders. NLB is 
therefore a key variable to monitor when 
assessing the short- to medium-term impact of 
balance sheet adjustment on GDP growth. 
I.2. Past episodes of balance sheet 
adjustment 
Corporate NLB has fluctuated substantially in the 
past in the euro area. As Graph I.1 shows, there is 
a strong cyclical element to these movements. 
Following the bursting of the dot-com bubble and 
during the ensuing recession, euro-area corporate 
NLB increased from -4 % to -0.5 % of GDP in 
2004. It then fell steadily up to the beginning of 
the current crisis. During the current crisis, 
corporate NLB has again moved upwards sharply 
and has now reached a positive level. The 
corporate sector is therefore now a net provider of 
finance to the rest of the economy. Similar sharp 
rises in NLB have also been observed in a range 
of EU countries in the aftermath of big recessions.  
Notwithstanding these recent cyclical movements 
of NLB in the euro area, historical evidence 
shows that corporate balance sheet adjustment can 
also be very protracted in advanced economies. 
Box I.2 describes two typical examples of balance 
sheet adjustments in Germany and Japan that have 
lasted 10 to 15 years. In Japan, the adjustment 
started in 1991 and is still ongoing. In Germany, 
the adjustment began in 2001 and is probably also 
still ongoing. 
Graph I.1: Corporate NLB, euro area (in % of 
GDP) (1) 
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(1) Corporate net lending or borrowing (NLB). Based on 
quarterly national account data. 4 quarters backward moving 
average. Latest observation is 2010Q1. 
Source: Eurostat, non-financial quarterly sector accounts, 
Commission services. 
To go beyond the German and Japanese examples 
and shed more systematic light on balance sheet 
adjustment and its consequences, this focus 
section draws on the analysis of a broad sample of 
balance sheet adjustment episodes. The sample 
includes the 27 EU countries together with the US 
and Japan and covers the last three decades. A 
balance sheet adjustment event is defined as an 
increase in corporate NLB larger than 2 % of 
GDP, which lasts for more than one year. (3) In 
the sample, 31 episodes were identified. On 
average, the adjustment episodes lasted for 
8.3 years but there is substantial variation in the 
length of the adjustment, with a standard 
deviation of more than 5 years. Overall, the 
analysis of these episodes confirms that balance 
sheet adjustments can be very protracted. 
                                                        
(3) More details are presented in Ruscher and Wolff (2010), 
‘Corporate balance sheet adjustment: stylised facts, causes 
and consequences’, European Economy — Economic Paper 
(forthcoming). 
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I.3. Consequences of balance sheet 
adjustment 
Balance sheet adjustment episodes can have 
important macroeconomic consequences. For 
Germany and Japan, Box I.2 presents evidence 
that the balance sheet adjustment was used to 
reduce the debt burden of the corporate sector. It 
also had a strong impact on aggregate demand, 
with a combination of weaker investment and 
higher gross savings in both countries. The 
increase in savings was achieved on the back of 
either wage moderation (Germany) or a reduction 
in net property income (Japan). 
To assess more systematically the consequences 
of episodes of balance sheet adjustment, Table I.1 
shows the development of a number of key 
variables for the larger sample of 31 balance sheet 
adjustment episodes described above. It shows the 
value of the variables in the year prior to the 
adjustment and in year 4 of the adjustment. To 
gauge the effect of the adjustment, the change 
during the balance sheet adjustment is compared 
to the change that typically happens in the entire 
sample (i.e. all years for which data are available 
irrespective of the existence of a balance sheet 
adjustment). 
A number of results stand out. First, changes in 
corporate NLB are associated with major changes 
in a number of balance sheet variables. Corporate 
indebtedness falls by around 2 percentage points 
 
 
 
Box I.1: Some useful accounting identities and concepts
National account data provide a full set of income accounts for the corporate sector. The following concepts can be 
useful when assessing balance sheet consolidation processes: 
GOS: gross operating surplus 
VA: value added 
GBPI: gross balance of primary income 
GS: gross savings 
NLB: net lending or borrowing 
These concepts are linked by the following identities: 
GOS = VA – labour compensation – production taxes + production subsidies   (1) 
GBPI = GOS – Net property income      (2) 
GS = GBPI + net transfers received – taxes on income and wealth – other  (3) (*) 
NLB = GS – investment – other capital expenditure    (4) 
NLB = net acquisition of financial assets – net incurrence of liabilities  (5) 
Net lending or borrowing (NLB) can be derived from two sets of accounts. In the income accounts of the 
institutional sectors, it corresponds to the difference between savings and investment (equations (1) to (4)). But NLB 
is also the balancing variable of the financial transactions accounts. It is then the difference between the acquisition 
of financial assets and the incurrence of new liabilities (equation (5)). 
Corporate NLB is normally negative, reflecting the fact that the corporate sector is a net recipient of financial capital 
from other sectors of the economy (e.g. households). Corporations tend to issue more liabilities than they acquire 
financial assets because they need to raise financial capital to finance physical investment (machines, buildings 
etc…). But NLB may also move temporarily into positive territory when the corporate sector becomes a net acquirer 
of financial assets or pays back its debts. As can be seen from equations (1) to (4), corporations can mostly increase 
NLB by reducing wages, investment and capital payments (i.e. net property income) or by increasing value added 
(i.e. raising output prices). Government can affect corporate NLB via transfers and taxes.  
National accounts also include detailed accounts on both the financial transactions and balance sheets of the various 
sectors of the economy (corporations, households etc..). These allow to analyse developments in typical balance-
sheet ratios (e.g. the debt to equity ratio, debt to GDP ratio) and to identify the financial transactions that are the 
counterpart to a changes in NLB (e.g. whether the additional internal funds from an increase in NLB have been used 
to pay back debt or swap external capital with internal capital). 
(*) The "other" category covers the "adjustment for the change in net equity of households in pension fund reverses" and is 
generally small. 
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of GDP. This stands in contrast to the average 
increase of 5 percentage points of GDP occurring 
in the sample during a four-year period. 
Compared to the entire sample as a benchmark, 
the balance sheet adjustment has an effect of 
7 percentage points of GDP on corporate debt. 
Similarly, corporate leverage (i.e. the ratio of debt 
to equity) is reduced by almost 16 percentage 
points. There is also a small build-up of corporate 
liquidity. 
Adjustment can have significant effects on 
growth … 
Second, the adjustment is associated with 
significant macroeconomic effects. Real economic 
growth during the four-year adjustment period is 
significantly below the average growth in the 
sample. While in the full sample cumulated 
growth over four years is almost 10 %, growth in 
the adjustment episodes amounts to only 6.6 %, 
leaving GDP 3.3 % lower than it could have been 
without the adjustment.(4)  
… via investment and the wage bill 
The analysis identifies two principal drivers of the 
weaker growth performance. First, the adjustment 
is achieved by significantly lowering investment. 
Lower investment in turn leads to losses of 
aggregate demand and economic growth. Second, 
there is a strong reduction in the share of labour 
compensation in value added. In the adjustment 
 
                                                        
(4) These numbers obviously reflect a two-way causality as 
balance sheet adjustment can affect GDP growth but changes 
in GDP can also trigger changes in balance sheets.  
sample, corporate wage payments decrease by 
4.6 percentage points of value added. To raise the 
internal funds needed to fix balance sheets, 
corporations tend to cut their wage bill by 
reducing either wages or the labour force. The 
resulting curb on the wage share puts a drag on 
disposable income and ultimately on private 
consumption. In terms of aggregate demand, this 
wage bill channel actually emerges as more 
important for aggregate demand than the 
investment channel. It has so far been little 
discussed in the economic literature, which has 
tended to focus on the impact of changes in 
balance sheets on investment.  
I.4. Causes of balance sheet adjustment 
As corporate balance sheet adjustments can have 
significant effects on the economy, understanding 
their drivers is critical. There is a rich literature 
which explores the determinants of the structure 
of corporate balance sheets. (5) For example, 
transactions costs of debt issuance as well as 
managers' superior information about the firm's 
prospects may lead to increased reliance on 
retained earnings for new investments thereby 
lowering leverage ratios. (6) On the basis of firm-
level data, the microeconomic literature generally 
finds that corporations adjust their balance sheets 
in response to changes in balance sheet ratios such 
 
                                                        
(5) For example, Fama, E.F. and K.R. French (2002), ‘Testing 
trade-off and pecking order predictions about dividends and 
debt’, The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 15, No 1, pp. 1-
33. 
(6) For example, Myers, S.C. (1984), ‘The capital structure 
puzzle’, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 39, pp. 575-592. 
 
Table I.1: Consequences of balance sheet adjustment (1) 
t=0 t=4 Actual change (2) Average change in entire sample
Effect of balance 
sheet adjustment
Number of 
episodes
(A) (B) (C)=(B)-(A) (D) (E)=(C)-(D) (F) 
Debt / GDP 60.3 58.4 -1.9 5.2 -7.1 12
Leverage (3) 101.2 85.3 -15.9 -1.2 -14.7 12
Liquidity / VA (4) 30.0 33.4 3.4 0.9 2.5 10
Investment / VA 26.1 23.2 -2.9 -0.2 -2.8 16
Savings / VA 17.2 22.3 5.0 0.4 4.6 16
Compensation of 
employees / VA 60.2 55.6 -4.6 -0.9 -3.7 20
Real growth 6.6 9.9 -3.3 24
(1) To ensure a constant size of the sample for every year, the table covers only those events which lasted more than 4 years and for which 
the respective data are available. The number of observations per variable differs for due to data availability reasons. Period. t=0 is the year 
prior to the balance sheet adjustment. "‘VA’" is value added. 
(2) In the case of "real growth" the actual change is the difference between the cumulated growth during the 4-year adjustment period and 
the cumulated growth in the broader sample during an average 4 year period. 
(3) Leverage is measured by the ratio of debt to equity (data from the balance sheet section of national accounts). 
(4) Liquidity is measured by corporations'’ holdings of "‘currency and deposits’" (data from the balance sheet section of national accounts). 
Source: Commission services. 
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as leverage. There is, however, little empirical 
evidence on the causes of large balance sheet 
adjustments at the macroeconomic level. The 
detailed analysis of the specific episodes in Japan 
and Germany as well as an econometric analysis 
of the 31 episodes described above (see Box I.3) 
point to a number of factors that contribute to 
triggering large balance sheet consolidations.  
First, large shocks to asset prices can trigger 
corporate balance sheet adjustment. In Japan, the 
collapse of the housing bubble (see Graph I.2) as 
well as the accompanying collapse of stock 
markets in the early 1990s put a large burden on 
Japanese corporate balance sheets. Also in 
Germany, there was a sharp stock market decline, 
which was particularly pronounced in the new 
 
 
Box I.2: Balance sheet adjustment in Germany and Japan: similarities and differences
Both Germany and Japan have experienced very protracted and significant episodes of balance sheet adjustment in 
the corporate sector (see left panel of graph below). In Japan, the balance sheet adjustment started in 1991, lasted for 
around 15 years and involved an increase in corporate net lending/borrowing (NLB) by more than 15 percentage 
points of GDP. In Germany, there was an upward shift in corporate NLB around the turn of the century. While its 
magnitude was far smaller than in Japan, it was nevertheless very significant in economic terms, amounting to a 
shift of around 3 percentage points of GDP.  
In both countries, the balance sheet adjustment process significantly transformed corporate balance sheets. As the 
right panel of the graph shows, in Germany as well as Japan, corporate indebtedness increased rapidly in the years 
preceding the balance sheet adjustment. In contrast, the consolidation process was associated with phases of 
stabilisation and/or fall of indebtedness. This suggests that part of the internal funds made available by the rise in 
NLB was used to reduce debt stocks. In the case of Germany, there is also evidence of corporate liquidity build-up 
(i.e. an accumulation of liquid assets). However, there is no evidence of a similar trend in Japan. 
NLB in the corporate sector, Japan and Germany 
(in % of GDP) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Source: Commission services and Financial Statement 
Statistics, Ministry of Finance, Japan. 
 
In both countries, the increase in corporate NLB resulted from both a fall in corporate investment and an increase in 
corporate savings (see the table below). Interestingly, both countries had, however, different strategies to achieve the 
rise in corporate savings. In Japan, in a situation of falling gross value added, the compensation of employees was 
held fairly constant and savings increased thanks to a sharp fall in net property income, with lower interest and/or 
dividend payments. In contrast, in Germany, corporate savings were raised by reducing the compensation of labour. 
The investment rate fell significantly in both countries.  
Corporate balance sheet adjustment in Germany and Japan  
(changes in pp of GDP during the adjustment period) (1) 
 Investment Savings Wages NFC wages 
Net property 
income 
DE -1.8 4.0 -2.9 -6.5 0.2 
JP -4.9 8.8 N/A 0.8 -6.6 
(1) Changes for the total corporate sector in percentage points of GDP except for ‘NFC wages’, where changes refer to 
changes in wage share in percent of value added of the non-financial sector. For DE, the change refers to 2000-2007 
while for Japan it is 1990-2005. 
Source: Ameco; for NFC wage share: Eurostat and Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs, Statistics Bureau. 
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market segment that was actually closed in June 
2003 (NEMAX, see Graph I.3). (7) 
According to Koo (2003), Japanese corporations 
responded to the massive shock in asset price 
values in the 1990s by adjusting their balance 
sheets. (8) As the companies were generating 
reasonable cash-flows, bankruptcy was rejected 
by many chief executives and instead the earnings  
from the core business were used to repay 
outstanding debt and improve balance sheets. (9) 
This translated into a massive increase in 
corporate NLB. The econometric evidence 
presented in Box I.3 corroborates these results. It 
shows that balance sheet adjustments are more 
likely to occur following a drop in the stock 
market. 
Graph I.2: Land prices in Japan  
(Index 100= 2000) (1) 
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(1) Index covers total average of urban land in Japan. 
Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 
Statistics Bureau, Japan. 
Second, corporate indebtedness and high 
leverage are a further factor determining 
corporate balance sheet adjustment. In the so-
called trade-off model, firms target an optimal 
leverage ratio which depends on the costs and 
benefits of additional debt. (10) In an uncertain and 
changing environment, this process may lead to 
periods of overshooting in the debt level. To the 
                                                        
(7) The index continued to be computed up to 17 December 2004 
to assure the continuity of derivatives transactions. For an in-
depth analysis of the Neuer Markt, see von Kalckreuth, U. 
and L. Silbermann (2010), ‘Bubbles and incentives: a post-
mortem of the Neuer Markt in Germany’, Deutsche 
Bundesbank Discussion Paper No 15. 
(8) Koo, R.C. (2003), ‘Balance sheet recession: Japan’s struggle 
with uncharted economics and its global implications’, John 
Wiley and Son, Hoboken, USA. 
(9) An alternative interpretation is that banks continued to roll 
over loans since they wanted to avoid realising large losses, 
see Caballero, R.J., T. Hoshi and A.K. Kashyap (2008), 
‘Zombie lending and depressed restructuring in Japan’, 
American Economic Review, Vol. 98, No 5, pp. 1943-77. 
(10) See for example: Fama and French (2002), op. cit.  
extent that they signal a deviation from the 
optimal leverage ratio, large debt levels or high 
leverage ratios should increase the likelihood of 
corporate balance sheet adjustments. This is 
confirmed by the econometric evidence in 
Box I.3. Balance sheet adjustments are 
significantly more likely to occur when the ratio 
of debt to GDP or leverage ratios are high.  
Third, a significant fall in economic growth is 
also likely to trigger a phase of balance sheet 
consolidation. The econometric evidence 
presented in Box I.3 shows that a negative shock 
to growth in the year prior to the adjustment 
increases the likelihood of balance sheet 
adjustment. This seems to reflect a response of 
corporations to both cyclical and structural 
factors. On the one hand, faced with a temporary 
slump in activity, corporations tend to adopt more 
prudent financial behaviours. They postpone debt 
issuance and accumulate precautionary buffers in 
the form of liquid financial assets. This cyclical 
effect was successfully tested in the regressions 
using the output gap as a regressor. On the other 
hand, changes in the long-term growth potential 
alter the expected future income streams of 
corporations. This changes the optimal level of 
investment but also the optimal level of debt. 
Moreover, it also changes the time profile of 
financing needs, rendering a switch to internal 
finance more likely. The econometric evidence 
indicates that a fall in the long-term growth 
potential also increases the likelihood of balance 
sheet adjustments. 
Graph I.3: Neuer Markt in Germany (1) 
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(1) Index NEMAX50 and DAX. 
Source: Bloomberg. 
Fourth, changes in the cost of financing can also 
trigger balance sheet adjustments in the non-
financial corporate sector. There is some evidence  
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Box I.3: Determinants of balance sheet adjustments – Evidence from a large panel of countries
To get a better understanding of the macroeconomic factors that can trigger balance sheet adjustments, this box 
presents a probit analysis of past episodes of balance sheet adjustment in advanced economies. The probit estimation 
approach allows to test whether a range of explanatory macroeconomic variables increase the probability to observe 
an episode of balance sheet adjustment.  
The sample of balance sheet episodes covers the 27 EU countries together with the US and Japan with data going as 
far back as the 1970s for some countries. A balance sheet adjustment event is defined as an increase of corporate net 
lending/borrowing (NLB) larger than 2% of GDP, which lasts for more than one year. Altogether, 31 episodes were 
identified in the sample. On average, the adjustment episode lasted for 8.3 years but there is substantial variation in 
the length of the adjustment with a standard deviation of more than 5 years. 
The table below presents the main regression results. All explanatory variables were included with the first lag to 
mitigate reverse causality problems. * 
Determinants of balance sheet adjustment (1) 
 A B C D E F G 
∆(growth)(t-1) -7.80 -31.65 -31.44     
 -3.11 -4.57 -4.56     
debt/VA(t-1)  0.005  0.005 0.009   
  1.98  1.73 2.2   
liquidity/VA(t-1) (2)  -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 
  -0.82 -0.67 -1.39 -1.87 -0.6 -0.64 
∆stock(t-1)    1.89 -1.70   
    3.1 -2.67   
leverage(t-1) (3)   0.01   0.00 0.01 
   2.16   1.93 2.17 
∆(sentiment)(t-1)      -0.05  
      -3.31  
Output gap       -0.16 
       -3.25 
∆(potential growth)(t+1)       -0.63 
       -2.81 
N 795 315 315 251 224 237 278 
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.21 0.21 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.17 
Obs. excluded     Japan   
(1) ∆ represents the first difference operator. Z-values below the coefficients 
(2) Liquidity is measured by corporations' holdings of "currency and deposits" (data from the balance sheet 
section of national accounts).  
(3) Leverage is measured by the ratio of debt to equity (data from the balance sheet section of national 
accounts). 
Source: Commission services. 
 
The Probit estimations allow identifying several drivers of balance sheet adjustment episodes, including negative 
shocks to growth, high leverage and falls in equity prices. A fall in the rate of real GDP growth significantly 
increases the probability of observing a balance sheet adjustment (Column A). High indebtedness in the corporate 
sector also significantly raises the likelihood of balance sheet adjustments. This is true whether indebtedness is 
captured via the ratio of debt to value added (Column B) or via a measure of leverage (Column C), with the latter 
regressor showing a slightly stronger explanatory power. Regressions were also run using the first difference of the 
main national stock market index (Dax, Cac40 etc.) as regressor. They show that a negative shock to equity prices 
increases the probability of balance sheet adjustments (Column D). However, this variable is correlated with the 
growth variable which then becomes insignificant. The ratio of liquidity to valued added generally comes out as 
statistically insignificant. If, however, Japan (where liquidity developments have been very different from the 
typical pattern observed in other countries) is excluded from the sample, the liquidity coefficient becomes 
significant (Column E): a low level of liquidity raises the probability of occurrence of a balance sheet adjustment 
episode. Finally, tests were also carried out to assess the respective effects of the business cycle and long-term  
 
(Continued on the next page)
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that changes in bank lending conditions could 
have contributed to the balance sheet adjustment 
in Germany. (11) In the regression analysis, no 
effect is found for the impact of the interest 
rate (12) but, as noted earlier, financing costs as 
captured by stock market prices were found to be 
a significant determinant.  
Fifth, a further factor influencing non-financial 
corporate balance sheet adjustments is the 
functioning of the financial sector. The NLB 
adjustment in Japan started before the Japanese 
credit crunch of 1997-98. So it is unlikely that the 
adjustment was triggered by difficulties in the 
financial intermediation sector. However, it was 
clearly aggravated by the credit crunch as 
evidenced by a surge in NLB of 7.5 pp of GDP in 
1998. The negative effects of a dysfunctioning 
financial sector are, however, not restricted to 
episodes of credit crunch. Corporate NLB 
remained at high levels even after the credit 
crunch in Japan, pointing to continued reliance on 
internal finance despite an easing of credit 
conditions.  
The literature on the Japanese crisis helps to 
understand how persistent difficulties in the 
financial sector can aggravate the negative 
macroeconomic impact of balance sheet 
adjustment in the non-financial corporate sector. 
Peek and Rosengren (2005) (13) document that 
                                                        
(11) Schumacher, D. (2006), "Capital markets and the end of 
Germany Inc", Goldman Sachs, Global Economics Paper, 
No. 144. 
(12) This may be due to the fact that, in the absence of proper 
series of corporate debt yields, only government bond yields 
were tested as a regressor. 
(13) Peek, J. and E.S. Rosengren (2005), ‘Unnatural selection: 
perverse incentives and the misallocation of credit in Japan’, 
American Economic Review, Vol. 95, No 4, pp. 1144-66. 
credit continued to be extended to corporations 
with balance sheet difficulties by those banks that 
were closely affiliated to the respective companies 
(keiretsu), thereby locking capital into less 
productive incumbent firms. Caballero, Hoshi and 
Kashyap (2008) argue that subsidised lending to 
firms (i.e. lower requested interest payments) kept 
‘zombie’ firms alive, slowed down adjustment 
and significantly weakened productivity and 
employment growth.  
This ‘zombie’ story can be linked to a high level 
of NLB. Japanese corporations with severe 
balance sheet problems increased NLB to repair 
balance sheets. Instead of bankruptcy, they 
continued to survive as banks were willing to roll 
over outstanding debt in order to avoid 
acknowledging large losses. (14) The ‘special’ 
relationship between banks and corporations in 
Japan thus slowed adjustment in the corporate 
sector with negative consequences for 
productivity growth while at the same time 
putting a drag on demand via higher corporate 
NLB. While stable bank-corporate relations can 
be beneficial during crisis times, interrelated 
linkages can also stifle adjustment and innovation 
after crisis. There is a need to investigate this in 
greater detail for euro-area countries. 
Overall, a weak banking sector can therefore 
matter for adjustments in the non-financial 
corporate sector via two channels. First, a "credit 
crunch", i.e. a lack of external credit, forces 
companies to rely on internal finance. This will 
show up in rapidly rising NLB and weak growth 
of the credit constrained companies. Second, in 
the "zombie" case, rapid adjustment of balance 
                                                        
(14) Corporate defaults would have burdened the balance sheets 
of banks and increased stress in the financial system. 
Box (continued) 
 
changes in potential growth. Regressors in regression F include the economic sentiment indicator to capture the 
business cycle. Results show that a drop in economic sentiment increases the probability of balance sheet 
adjustment. In regression G, the output gap and the expected change in potential growth (as proxied by estimates of 
potential growth for the next year) are both added as regressors. While this exercise should be taken with a grain of 
salt due to possible serious endogeneity problems, the results nevertheless suggest that balance sheet adjustments not 
only react to cyclical downturns but also to changes in long-term trends in potential growth. 
Overall, results show that corporate balance sheet adjustments happen in response to bad balance sheet 
fundamentals, negative shocks to equity markets, sharp growth downturns as well as reductions in long-term growth 
potentials. Policies that facilitate balance sheet adjustment and improve bad balance sheet ratios therefore appear to 
be key factors in reducing the negative effects of protracted balance sheet adjustments on the economy. 
* More detailed results and robustness checks are described in: Ruscher, E and G. Wolff (2010), "Corporate balance 
sheet: stylized facts, causes and consequences", European Economy – Economic Paper, forthcoming. 
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sheets in the non-financial corporate sector via 
bankruptcy is held back by continued bank 
lending to weak companies in the fear of credit 
losses if lending is terminated. 
Finally, the corporate governance system as 
well as the tax system can influence corporate 
balance sheet behaviour. Corporate governance 
issues can influence the decision to rely on 
internal finance instead of debt. For example, in 
the absence of appropriate equity markets, small 
and medium-sized companies have stronger 
incentives to rely on internal finance than large 
companies. Corporate NLB could therefore be 
influenced by firm governance structures. (15)  
Tax issues could explain some of the German 
developments in NLB. In 2000, Germany passed a 
new tax law affecting corporations and 
households after 2000. (16) The reform included 
changes in income as well as corporate taxation. 
The Bundesbank in an article in its monthly 
bulletin of August 2000 discusses the allocation 
effects of the law. It is shown that corporate taxes 
on profits are reduced. The reduction is 
particularly significant for those profits that are 
retained in the company. An important conclusion 
drawn by the Bundesbank is therefore that this 
‘clear favouring of self-financing will tend to 
interfere with the allocation function of capital 
markets and will put young firms at a 
disadvantage.’ (17) It is therefore plausible to 
relate part of the increase in corporate NLB after 
2000 to the effects of the law. Moreover, it 
appears likely that this tax law actually weighed 
on the growth performance of the German 
corporate sector as a whole since it favoured 
incumbent firms. 
Overall, this section has highlighted a number of 
drivers of corporate balance sheet adjustment 
based on two case studies and econometric 
evidence. The results show that corporate balance 
sheets are adjusted in response to large asset price 
shocks and high debt or high leverage in the 
corporate sector. Moreover, a fall in growth and 
growth potential can contribute to triggering an 
adjustment. The results also indicate that 
problems in the financial system can aggravate 
non-financial corporate balance sheet adjustment 
                                                        
(15) See also Schumacher (2006), op. cit. Corporate NLB might 
increase more strongly following a negative shock in those 
countries where the average firm size is rather small. 
(16) NLB in the non-financial corporate sector in Germany fell 
steeply in 2000, a year in which corporate tax payments were 
exceptionally high. Taxation already played an important role 
for NLB prior to the tax reform. 
(17) Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly Report, August 2000, p. 61. 
processes. Finally, although the tax system 
usually favours debt financing, some changes in 
the tax system may alter economic incentives so 
as to increase firms' reliance on internal finance. 
I.5. Implications for the recovery  
Part of the recent rise in corporate NLB is 
probably cyclical … 
As documented at the beginning of this focus 
section, corporate NLB has surged in the euro 
area since the beginning of the global recession. 
Part of the increase is probably of a cyclical 
nature. The analysis of past episodes of balance 
sheet adjustment presented earlier shows that 
balance sheets respond to the business cycle. In 
the euro area, a cyclical pattern was clearly visible 
in NLB data during the downturn of the early 
2000s and is likely to be repeated in the current 
business cycle. If the previous downturn is to be 
of any guidance, balance sheets could, however, 
be a relatively persistent source of cyclical 
pressures on aggregate demand: in the first half of 
the decade, corporate NLB reached its peak only 
2.5 to 3 years after the beginning of the downturn 
and several quarters after the output gap began to 
close.  
… but lasting balance sheet effects could weigh 
on the recovery 
In addition to cyclical effects, there are also 
several reasons to worry about more protracted 
structural forces that could weigh on corporate 
balance sheets and aggregated demand in the euro 
area during the recovery. These include the 
existence of a debt overhang in the private sector, 
changes in risk attitudes and medium-term 
downside risks to potential growth. There is 
evidence that the euro-area corporate sector 
entered the global recession with a debt 
overhang that was both significant and higher 
than at the beginning of the previous downturn. 
According to estimates by Kok Sørensen et al. 
(2009), corporate debt was close to the level 
suggested by fundamentals in the early 2000s but 
about 15 % above equilibrium on the eve of the 
global recession. (18)  
To the best of our knowledge, estimates of 
equilibrium credit levels are not available for 
individual Member States but in some of them, 
where booming credit in pre-crisis years has led to 
                                                        
(18) Kok Sørensen, C., D. Marqués Ibáñez and C. Rossi 
(2009),‘Modelling loans to non-financial corporations in the 
euro area’, ECB Working Paper Series No 989 (January). 
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very high leverage, the overhang is in all 
likelihood considerably higher than for the euro 
area as a whole. In fact, during the current 
recession corporate NLB has increased much 
more strongly in some countries than in others 
(see Graph I.4). Especially Slovenia, Spain and 
Ireland experienced a corporate balance sheet 
adjustment far exceeding the euro-area average. 
At the same time, the adjustment was lower than 
the average in particular in the Netherlands, 
Germany and Finland. 
Graph I.4: Changes in corporate NLB across 
euro-area countries (in pp of GDP, 2007-09) 
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These differences are indicative of different 
adjustment needs across euro-area countries and 
corroborate the idea of the existence of pockets of 
excess indebtedness in the euro-area 
periphery. (19) This can be further seen in 
Graph I.5. The financial crisis has generally 
triggered a much steeper rise in corporate NLB in 
the Member States which entered the recession 
with comparatively elevated levels of corporate 
debt. This is suggestive of the beginning of a debt 
consolidation process across the euro area which 
is unevenly distributed.  
In addition to the correction of past debt excesses, 
the global crisis has triggered changes in 
attitudes towards risks that may also have a 
lasting impact on corporate balance sheets. The 
crisis will likely entail a general and lasting 
increase in risk premia that will push up the cost 
of capital. For corporations, this will entail an 
increase in the cost of external funds relative to 
internal funds and a strong incentive to rely more 
on self-finance. Furthermore, the change in risk 
attitudes is likely to be particularly potent in the 
                                                        
(19) See also: European Commission (2010), ‘Surveillance of 
intra-euro area competitiveness and imbalances’, European 
Economy 1/2010. 
case of bank lending as both banks and their 
customers become more aware of the risks 
associated with their lending and borrowing 
activity. Changes in bank lending practices could 
have a particularly strong impact on small and 
medium-sized companies, for which banks 
constitute the only source of external funding, 
leading to lasting deleveraging pressures in that 
sector.  
Graph I.5: Debt levels and changes in NLB in 
the corporate sector, euro-area Member States 
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Finally, unless appropriate policies are put in 
place, the crisis could have a negative legacy for 
the production potential via its impact on the 
accumulation of capital and knowledge, as well as 
hysteresis effects on the labour market. (20) The 
econometric work presented in this focus section 
has identified a strong relationship between 
growth (both cyclical and structural) and the 
probability of balance sheet adjustment episodes. 
Durable losses in production potential would 
therefore aggravate considerably the risks of a 
protracted phase of balance sheet adjustment in 
the euro area.  
Policy implications and conclusion 
The analysis presented in this focus section 
suggests that the euro area is facing a period of 
balance sheet adjustment in response to changes 
in risk attitudes brought by the crisis, a debt 
overhang, difficulties in the banking sector as well 
as weaker growth prospects. The evidence 
suggests that the adjustment could take several 
years and given the magnitude of the shock it is 
possible that several countries face up to a decade 
of balance sheet adjustment. In a world of  
 
                                                        
(20) See for instance: European Commission (2009), ‘The impact 
of the crisis on potential growth’, Quarterly Report on the 
Euro Area, Vol. 8(2). 
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imperfect capital markets, such an adjustment 
may have a protracted effect on aggregate demand 
– in particular in some countries – as companies 
strive to curb costs and investment. The negative 
consequences on macroeconomic demand could 
be magnified if the appropriate policies are not 
put in place. In particular, action would be needed 
in three areas.  
First, and as advocated repeatedly by the 
European Commission in the past year, fixing the 
banking sector is essential to lay solid foundations 
for a sustainable recovery. As shown by the 
Japanese experience, persistent weakness in the 
balance sheets of the financial sector has a 
counterpart in the non-financial corporate sector, 
where it can aggravate balance sheet adjustment 
processes and their negative macroeconomic 
effects.  
Second, it is important to put in place the policy 
required to mitigate the impact of the crisis on 
potential growth. This is needed because losses in 
output potential have clear welfare implications 
for households but also because a downshift in 
potential growth is likely to be associated with a 
protracted phase of retrenchment in aggregate 
demand due to corporate balance sheet 
consolidation. The frontloading initiative under 
the Europe 2020 strategy is critical in this respect 
as it calls for urgent implementation of significant 
reform measures that contribute to growth within 
a two to three year period. Measures that should 
 
be considered in that context include those that 
support the ongoing reform of the financial sector, 
those that positively and rapidly impact on 
confidence but also structural reforms in the 
labour and product markets whose effects start to 
be felt in the short to medium term (say after 
some 2 years). The full and, where possible early, 
implementation of Community legislation (e.g. 
services directive, opening up of energy markets) 
could also contribute to support growth. 
Third, policies that would ease the ongoing 
balance sheet process would also help to shore up 
the recovery. Further work is needed to identify 
practical policy instruments but several broad 
areas for policy intervention can be identified. 
Given that banking crises tend to weigh 
particularly on smaller companies, for which bank 
lending is the main source of external funds, 
measures aimed at facilitating access to equity 
markets by SMEs would be useful. As shown by 
the analysis of the past German experience, 
limiting the negative consequences of balance 
sheet adjustment on growth may also require 
acting on those structural features of the economy 
that restrict companies’ access to capital markets. 
These may include elements of the tax system that 
favour financial investment by corporations, as 
seems to have been the case in Germany since the 
late 1990s. Features of the corporate governance 
system that hinder the use of external capital (e.g. 
because of corporate control considerations) could 
also be examined.  
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II.1. A look at past episodes of adjustment 
to current account deficits  
Large and persistent current ac count deficits in 
some euro-area Member States are a cause for 
concern. They are a manifestation of domestic 
imbalances that have built up in pre-crisis 
years. (21) They have increased the vulnerability 
of euro-area economies, which was brutally 
exposed by the crisis. The crisis has triggered the 
beginning of a current account rebalancing in 
some of the Member States concerned. It is of 
great importance for the euro-area economy that 
the adjustment process continues, expands to all 
                                                        
(21) European Commission (2010), Surveillance of intra-euro-
area competitiveness and imbalances, European Economy 
No 1. 
the countries concerned and leads to a durable 
correction of external imbalances.  
In order to better understand the macroeconomic 
consequences of rebalancing processes, this 
section offers a first look into a wide sample of 
episodes of rebalancing of current account deficits 
in industrialised economies. 
More specifically, the analysis is based on a 
sample of adjustment episodes that took place in 
23 industrialised economies during the period 
1970-2009 (for more information on methodology 
and data see Box II.1.1). Developments in a broad 
range of macroeconomic variables around the 
time of the adjustment are averaged across the 
episodes to identify typical adjustment patterns.  
 
Persistent, large current account deficits in some euro-area Member States are a cause for concern. A durable 
correction of these imbalances is of great importance for the functioning of the economy of the euro area. The 
first section in this chapter looks at a large sample of past episodes of rebalancing of current account deficits 
in advanced economies. It draws some preliminary conclusions on the patterns and factors shaping adjustment 
episodes. It concludes that the corporate sector played an essential role in the correction of external imbalance 
and that flexibility in prices, wages and exchange rates, including in the non-tradable part of the economy, 
helped to make adjustment more sustainable and less costly in terms of GDP growth and unemployment. There 
is also evidence that, in many cases, the burden of the adjustment fell primarily on investment, thereby 
hampering potential growth. In episodes that took place under fixed exchange rate arrangements, price and 
wage flexibility was usually not high enough to compensate for the lack of nominal exchange rate adjustment, 
leading to losses in competitiveness. This is probably one of the main explanations for the weaker 
developments in GDP and employment observed in those episodes relative to the broader sample.  
In July, a joint mission by the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF concluded that the Greek 
government’s economic adjustment programme had made a strong start led by vigorous implementation of the 
fiscal programme and impressive structural reforms. However, important challenges remained, in particular 
regarding the country’s external imbalances. To shed some light on these external imbalances, the second 
section in this chapter looks at the Greek export sector on the basis of industry and firm-level data. To reduce 
its current account deficit, Greece needs to redirect a significant part of its output from the domestic sector to 
exports. This will require protracted efforts to reverse some of the past losses in price competitiveness and to 
boost non-price competitiveness. However, an analysis of firm-level data shows that the Greek export sector 
presents some structural features that could facilitate this process. In particular, most Greek firms export some 
of their output. The share of output exported is generally low but firms with an existing export base can 
contribute more easily and more rapidly to boosting total exports than firms that have never exported. Raising 
the quantity sold through an established foreign distribution network is indeed less costly than entering new 
markets. Overall, this suggests that future efforts to restore competitiveness could pay off relatively rapidly in 
terms of boosting Greece’s export performance. 
The final section presents a quantitative assessment of imbalances on housing markets based on estimations of 
equilibrium house prices and price-to-rent ratios. According to estimations of equilibrium house prices, the 
overvaluation of house prices in the euro area was approximately half of that of the US at the end of 2008, with 
the two regions experiencing similar price drops during 2009. There are, however, significant differences 
across Member States. By the end of 2009, the house-price correction was quite advanced, especially in the 
Netherlands, France and Ireland. At the other end of the spectrum, German house prices are an outlier as they 
appear to be slightly undervalued. Cyclical deviations of price-to-rent ratios from their long-term trends 
confirm these econometric results. 
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The initial sample of episodes is then broken 
down into sub-samples to identify specific 
features present in specific adjustment episodes. 
In the economic literature, a number of studies 
have adopted a similar approach to study current 
account rebalancing. (22) This strand of research 
was initially centred on emerging markets. 
However, with the build-up of current account 
imbalances in advanced economies, its focus has 
recently been extended to industrial economies. 
Overall, this literature has addressed a range of 
questions related to current account adjustment. 
Nevertheless, some issues that are particularly 
relevant for euro-area Member States may not 
have received sufficient attention. In particular, 
the present analysis endeavours to shed some light 
on the effect of adjustment on GDP growth and 
unemployment, the role of price and wage 
flexibility and differences between fixed and 
flexible exchange rate regimes. The issue of the 
sustainability of the adjustment, which has been 
largely ignored in the literature, is also discussed.  
A typical episode of current account 
adjustment involves the domestic side of the 
economy … 
Based on the criteria set out in Box II.1.1, the base 
sample of episodes contains 44 episodes of 
adjustments to current account deficits (labelled 
‘All episodes’ in the charts). The base sample is 
also divided into two smaller sub-samples 
("Sustainable episodes" and "Growth friendly 
episodes" in the charts) to study episodes of 
sustainable current account rebalancing and more 
growth-friendly adjustments (see Box II.1.1 for 
details). 
Looking first into the base sample (other sub-
samples will be discussed later), on average, the 
current account starts to adjust when the deficit 
reaches 5 % of GDP (the trough year) 
(Graph II.1.1). This improvement in the current 
account is an outcome of an adjustment taking 
place on both the domestic and the external side 
of the economy. 
From an accounting point of view, the current 
account can be viewed as the saving-investment 
balance of the economy. Therefore, the current 
account can improve either via a fall in 
investment and/or via an increase in savings. Both 
effects are visible in the base sample, but the 
                                                        
(22) For a review of the literature see Algieri, B. and T. Bracke 
(2007) ‘Patterns of current account adjustments — insights 
from past experience’, CESifo Working Paper, No 2029. 
effect of falling investment dominates 
(Graph II.1.2). While investment drops sharply 
already in the first year of adjustment, savings 
take more time to adjust and the saving rate starts 
increasing only in the third year (Graph II.1.3).  
The total current account (i.e. the net lending or 
borrowing position of the economy or NLB) is the 
sum of saving and investment decisions by the 
main institutional sectors, namely households, 
corporations and the general government sector. 
Therefore, the adjustment of the total current 
account can be broken down into sectoral 
contributions. (23) This breakdown shows that, on 
average in the sample, the improvement in the 
external position is mainly due to the corporate 
sector, where the NLB increases sharply in the 
first two years of the adjustment episode 
(Graph II.1.4). The household sector seems to 
contribute more to the phase of deterioration of 
the current account than to its improvement. The 
government sector, on the other hand, plays a 
moderately offsetting role. While its contribution 
to the build-up of the current account deficit is 
very small, when the adjustment starts, 
government balances deteriorate, moderating the 
impact of the private sector’s adjustment on 
growth and the external position. 
Graph II.1.1: Current account (% of GDP) (1) 
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(1) Based on adjustment episodes in 23 industrialised economies 
during the period 1970-2009. See Box II.1.1 for a definition of 
the different samples. 
Source: Commission services. 
The balance sheet adjustment by the private sector 
has visible negative effects on domestic demand. 
On average, demand starts slowing down already 
in the year of the current account trough and 
shrinks slightly in the first year of adjustment. 
                                                        
(23) Due to data limitations the sectoral breakdown into 
corporations, households and general government is limited 
to 13 cases for which data are available for all sectors for 
10 years around the adjustment. 
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Consistent with the larger role of corporations in 
adjustment, investment, which contracts by 3 % in 
the first year, is the main driver of the weakening 
of domestic demand. Consumption slows down as 
well (a deceleration which actually starts before 
the current account adjustment) but is less 
affected than investment. 
… as well as the external sector … 
The average episode also points to a significant 
contribution of exports to the rebalancing process. 
Exports, which due to moderating foreign demand 
had been slowing down gradually before the 
adjustment, pick up again in the adjustment phase. 
The acceleration of exports is linked to increases 
in market shares, with world trade moderating 
further during the adjustment phase. The surge in 
exports and market shares is due to improving 
price competitiveness. Various measures of the 
real exchange rates show an improvement which 
starts already two years before the trough in 
current account. Although competitiveness gains 
are partly explained by a depreciating nominal 
exchange rate, they also reflect substantial wage 
moderation: nominal wages moderate sharply at 
the beginning of the adjustment process 
(Graph II.1.5). Real wages adjust as well. An 
increase in inflation, probably induced by nominal 
depreciation, leads to a virtual freeze of real 
wages in the first two years of adjustment. 
Graph II.1.2: Investment rate (% of GDP, total 
economy) (1) 
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(1) Based on adjustment episodes in 23 industrialised economies 
during the period 1970-2009. See Box II.1.1 for a definition of 
the different samples. 
Source: Commission services. 
Adjusting to current account deficits is usually 
costly … 
All in all, these developments on the domestic and 
external side of the economy visible in the base 
sample show that the average current account 
adjustment bears costs in terms of growth and 
employment. On average in the sample, GDP 
growth moderates slightly already before the 
adjustment starts, slows down sharply in the first 
year and recovers only after three years 
(Graph II.1.6). Similarly, the output gap, which is 
still slightly positive in the year of the current 
account trough, turns negative in the first year of 
the adjustment. The gap widens further and 
reaches the level of almost 2 % of potential output 
in the third adjustment year, before slowly 
closing. Falling GDP growth has a visible 
negative impact on unemployment, which 
increases by 2 pp in the first three years. 
… and is not always sustainable 
The typical pattern of current account adjustment 
has a worrying feature. The current account 
improves for three consecutive years, and after 
remaining flat for one year, relapses slightly. The 
relapse is small but the large sample hides large 
variations. In around a quarter of the episodes, the 
current account starts to deteriorate again in the 
third year and in the fifth reaches on average the 
same level as in the trough year. As improving the 
functioning of EMU requires a sustainable 
correction of external imbalances, a new sub-
sample was built comprising 27 episodes of 
sustainable adjustment (see Box II.1.1 for details). 
Graph II.1.3: Saving rate (% of GDP, total 
economy) (1) 
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(1) Based on adjustment episodes in 23 industrialised economies 
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Source: Commission services. 
Sustainable adjustments are larger … 
A comparison of the base sample (‘all episodes’) 
with the sustainable episodes reveals interesting 
patterns. First, the size of the current account 
imbalance is the same in both samples 
(Graph II.1.1). This suggests that a deficit of a 
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given size can be corrected in either a sustainable 
or a non-sustainable way. Second, in episodes of 
sustainable rebalancing, the improvement of the 
current account is larger. 
Larger adjustment is visible on both the domestic 
and the external side. On the domestic side the 
additional adjustment is mainly due to sharper and 
more prolonged weakening of domestic demand 
with investment playing a central role 
(Graph II.1.2). In contrast, savings fall even 
slightly more during the first two years of the 
adjustment than in the base sample (Graph II.1.3). 
However, after the initial fall, savings recover 
and, unlike the base scenario, continue rising, 
contributing to the sustainability of the current 
account adjustment. The central role of the 
corporate sector is even further strengthened here, 
with households and the government sector 
maintaining patterns similar to those in the base 
sample.  
Graph II.1.4: NLB of corporations (% of GDP) (1)
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(1) Based on adjustment episodes in 23 industrialised economies 
during the period 1970-2009. See Box II.1.1 for a definition of 
the different samples. 
Source: Commission services. 
The external sector also behaves differently in 
sustainable cases of rebalancing, notably in the 
later stages of the adjustment process. In the third 
and fourth year of the adjustment, exports grow 
visibly faster than in the base sample, suggesting a 
key role in securing the sustainability of the 
adjustment. The difference in export patterns can 
be explained by additional gains in 
competitiveness in the sustainable cases, with all 
measures of the real exchange rate depreciating 
more sharply and more durably than in the base 
sample. The nominal exchange rate plays a role in 
this pattern, but domestic prices and wages seem 
to adjust more as well. Wages moderate faster and 
 
more strongly than in the base sample. After five 
years of adjustment, sustainable episodes record 
more than 1 pp of additional wage moderation 
compared to all the episodes. Real wages also 
moderate more significantly. 
Finally, the comparison of the two samples of 
episodes also suggests that sustainable current 
account adjustments tend to have some additional 
costs in terms of GDP, even if the gap in growth 
ultimately closes. The impact on unemployment is 
also larger. After four years of adjustment the 
unemployment rate is a half percent higher than in 
the base sample.  
… but vary in terms of growth effects  
This average growth picture hides, however, a 
substantial degree of heterogeneity. The 
27 episodes of sustainable adjustment show large 
differences in the impact on GDP growth. 
Comparing average GDP growth five years before 
and after the beginning of the adjustment, the 
growth performance during adjustment episodes 
ranges from an acceleration of 2.2 pp to a sharp 
drop of 5.3 pp. There are a few clear outliers in 
the sample. The cases of large losses in GDP are 
mainly episodes of adjustment to very large 
current account deficits, such as in Portugal 
(1982), New Zealand (1974, 1985) or Ireland 
(1981). This suggests that adjustments to very 
large imbalances are generally related to 
significant GDP slowdowns. Nevertheless, even 
after removing these outliers from the sample, the 
dispersion in GDP impact remains significant.  
Graph II.1.5: Nominal wages (annual % 
change) (1) 
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(1) Based on adjustment episodes in 23 industrialised economies 
during the period 1970-2009. See Box II.1.1 for a definition of 
the different samples. 
Source: Commission services. 
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To check the factors influencing the differences in 
GDP effects of sustainable current account 
adjustments, the 7 best cases were grouped into a 
separate ‘growth-friendly’ sub-sample. The 
comparison of the 7 best cases with the rest of the 
sustainable episodes (less the outliers mentioned 
above) shows that the pattern of current account 
in the two sub-samples is virtually the same. In 
other words, apart from the case of very large 
deficits, the size of the current account imbalance 
does not seem to determine its GDP effects.  
Two additional interesting features in this sub-
sample of growth-friendly episodes should be 
mentioned. The first is the behaviour of savings 
and investment. In the growth-friendly cases, the 
burden of adjusting the savings-investment ratio is 
clearly shifted towards savings, which rebound 
sharply after the first year of adjustment 
(Graph II.1.3). (24) At the same time, the 
                                                        
(24) Saving ratio falls also more sharply than in other samples 
before the adjustment and the link between pre- and post-
adjustment behaviour of savings would have to be 
investigated further. 
investment rate recovers, providing support for 
medium-term growth and potential output. The 
second feature worthy of attention is the role of 
wages and prices in the growth-friendly 
adjustment. The comparison of the samples 
confirms the common finding of the literature, 
namely that real depreciation helps mitigate the 
negative impact of current account adjustment on 
growth.  
However, the literature remains silent on the 
sources of this depreciation during adjustment 
episodes. The growth-friendly sample identified 
here shows that the improvement in 
competitiveness is partly related to the nominal 
exchange rate depreciation, but domestic price 
adjustments also play an important role in the 
episodes of growth-friendly current account 
adjustments. The size of wage moderation in this 
sample is indeed impressive (Graph II.1.5). Real 
wages also moderate strongly. Wage moderation 
helps to gain external competitiveness, which 
boosts exports. 
 
 
Box II.1.1: Current account adjustment — An analysis of past episodes in industrialised countries
Episodes of current account adjustment used in this section were identified on the basis of the following joint 
criteria:  
- the current account level in the trough year (t0) is equal to or lower than -1 % of GDP; 
- the current account improves by at least 1.5 % of GDP in three years; 
- the current account improvement in the first year of adjustment (t1) is larger than 0.5 % of GDP; 
- the current account level in the second year (t2) is above its initial level (t0); 
- the troughs in the current account between two successive episodes have to be separated by at least four years. 
Based on these criteria a first sample of 44 episodes was identified (‘all episodes’). To identify episodes of 
sustainable adjustment, an additional criterion was included, requiring the initial adjustment (minimum 1.5 %) to be 
maintained for at least the next two years. On the basis of this additional criterion, a sample of 27 ‘sustainable 
episodes’ was created. Finally, the sample of episodes in fixed exchange rate systems was selected from the base 
sample using the de facto classification of exchange rate systems of Reinhart and Rogoff (2002). (1) However, if 
during the period of three years before or after the trough year (t0) a realignment (in cases of formal fixed exchange 
rate arrangements) or significant nominal adjustment (in cases of de facto arrangements) took place, the episode was 
removed from the sample. This procedure initially led to a sample containing 10 episodes, which was reduced to 9 
after removing an outlier (Greece 2002). Current account adjustment episodes identified in the above samples were 
then mapped to other economic variables in order to analyse their behaviour during the period of adjustment. 
Data used here come from the Commission’s AMECO database. The sample covers 23 industrial countries (AT, 
AU, BE, CA, CH, CY, DE, DK, EL, ES, FI, FR, HK, IE, IT, JP, LU, NL, NZ, PT, SE, UK, US). The current 
account is defined as the net lending/borrowing of the total economy, supplemented with the balance on current 
transactions if the former is not available. 
                                                           
(1) Reinhart, C.M. and K.S. Rogoff (2002), ‘The modern history of exchange rate arrangements: a reinterpretation’, National 
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, No 8963.  
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Graph II.1.6: GDP growth (annual % change) (1) 
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(1) Based on adjustment episodes in 23 industrialised economies 
during the period 1970-2009. See Box II.1.1 for a definition of 
the different samples. 
Source: Commission services. 
Moreover, the growth-friendly episodes exhibit 
relatively large differences (compared to other 
episodes) in the developments of various 
measures of the real exchange rate (Graph II.1.7). 
Specifically, broader measures (based on GDP 
deflator or unit labour costs) depreciate more than 
the export price-based measure. The broad 
measures are based on costs and prices of both the 
tradable and non-tradable sectors, while the 
export-price measure covers only the tradable 
sector.  
Graph II.1.7: Real effective exchange rate 
developments in growth-friendly adjustment 
episodes (annual % change) (1) 
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(1) Real effective exchange rate deflated by the GDP deflator, 
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Source: Commission services. 
Different developments in the two types of 
measures of real effective exchange rate can be 
interpreted as changes in relative prices of 
tradables and non-tradables. Larger depreciation 
in broad measures of real effective exchange rate 
suggests that growth-friendly episodes involve 
also more downward adjustment in the relative  
 
prices of non-tradables, pointing to the potentially 
important role of the non-tradable sector in 
rebalancing processes. (25) 
What about current account rebalancing in 
fixed exchange rate regimes? 
In general, nominal exchange rates seem to have 
played a role in the adjustment episodes analysed 
above, even if changes in domestic prices were 
also important. In order to draw conclusions more 
relevant for the euro area, it can be useful to 
investigate in more detail the role of nominal 
exchange rate flexibility in adjustment episodes. 
For that purpose, episodes taking place in fixed 
exchange rate systems were selected from the 
base sample and grouped into a new sub-sample 
(see Box II.1.1). The sample is, however, very 
small (9 episodes) and conclusions derived from 
these data should be interpreted with caution.  
Graph II.1.8: GDP growth (annual % change) (1) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Two features of past adjustments in fixed 
exchange rate regimes emerge from this exercise. 
First, without the help of nominal exchange-rate 
depreciation, external price competitiveness does 
not improve and even deteriorates somewhat if 
broader real exchange rate measures are looked at. 
Nominal wages moderate eventually but with a  
 
                                                        
(25) Narrow measures of the real exchange rate are based on price 
or cost indices restricted to the tradable sector, while broad 
measures cover both the tradable and the non-tradable sector. 
Broad measures can thus be broken down into components 
capturing the price or cost competitiveness of the tradable 
sector and of the non-tradable sector. For a discussion of the 
role of the tradable and the non-tradable sectors in current 
account fluctuations, see Ruscher, E. and G.B. Wolff (2009), 
‘External rebalancing is not just an exporters’ story: real 
exchange rates, the non-tradable sector and the euro’, 
European Economy — Economic Papers, No 375. 
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significant time lag. As a consequence, and in  
contrast to the base sample, exports do not 
contribute to the adjustment and remain broadly 
flat during the adjustment phase.  
Second, GDP appears more negatively affected by 
the adjustment in episodes with fixed exchange 
rate systems than in the broader sample 
(Graph II.1.88). Similarly, the increase in 
unemployment is larger and in the fifth year of 
adjustment the unemployment rate is half a 
percentage point higher than in the base sample. 
More in-depth analysis would obviously be 
needed to take into account other possible 
differences between fixed exchange rate cases and 
other episodes. But the data a priori suggest that 
insufficient competitiveness adjustment is 
probably a key explanation of the weaker growth 
performance in fixed exchange rate arrangements 
during rebalancing periods. Indeed, various 
checks indicate that the weaker growth cannot be 
ascribed to monetary policy (which is generally 
looser during adjustment periods in fixed 
exchange rate episodes than in the broader sample 
where nominal depreciation fuels inflation and 
forces monetary authorities to step in) or 
differences in long-term interest rates.  
Conclusions 
This short review of past episodes of current 
account adjustment allows some preliminary, but 
important lessons to be drawn for the ongoing 
current account adjustment in the euro area.  
First, it emphasises the critical role of balance 
sheet adjustment in the private sector and 
especially in the corporate sector. With much of 
the burden of adjustment falling on investment, 
current account rebalancing poses risks for 
potential growth.  
Second, it shows the importance of flexibility in 
domestic costs and prices, which helps to improve 
external competitiveness, achieve sustainable 
current account adjustment and reduce its impact 
on growth. Flexibility concerns the prices of both 
traded and non-traded goods and services. In 
particular, the role of adjustment in the prices of 
non-tradables should not be underestimated. 
Moreover, the analysis shows that wage flexibility 
has a distinct role in adjustment episodes and 
plays an especially important role in moderating 
the impact of adjustment on growth. 
Third, the patterns visible in the episodes taking 
place in the fixed exchange rate regimes are a 
warning signal for the euro area. They confirm 
that in the absence of nominal exchange rate 
flexibility, rigidities in domestic costs and prices 
can be harmful for GDP growth and employment. 
For the Member States facing large current 
account adjustments, these findings underscore 
the urgent need for wage moderation and gains in 
competitiveness and, more generally, for reforms 
aimed at increasing the flexibility of the 
economy.(26) 
Finally, adjustments of current account deficits 
often bear costs in terms of growth and are not 
always sustainable.  
The above observations drawn from past 
experiences of current account adjustments are a 
strong argument for closely monitoring current 
accounts with a view to avoiding the re-
emergence of imbalances in the future. They 
underline the importance of putting in place a 
structured framework to monitor and address 
macroeconomic imbalances, including large 
current accounts deficits, in the euro area and the 
EU as proposed by the Commission in its 
legislative package of 29 September. 
                                                        
(26) For empirical evidence on the link between structural reforms 
and adjustment capacity see Biroli, P, G. Mourre and 
A. Turrini (2010), ‘Adjustment in the euro area and 
regulation of product and labour markets: an empirical 
assessment’, CEPR Discussion Paper, No. 8010. 
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II.2. A structural picture of Greek 
exports: insights from disaggregated 
data 
In August, a joint mission by the European 
Commission, the ECB and the IMF concluded 
that the Greek government's economic adjustment 
program had made a strong start led by vigorous 
implementation of the fiscal programme and 
impressive structural reforms. (27) However, 
important challenges remain, in particular 
regarding the country's external imbalances. 
Greece has indeed been running sizeable deficits 
in its external position since 2000, with the 
current account and the balance of trade in goods 
and services reaching lows of -14.6 % and -11.1 % 
of GDP in 2007. (28)  
To curb its external deficit, Greece will have to 
boost its export sector. This will require 
protracted efforts both to reverse some of the 
losses in price competitiveness incurred since the 
beginning of the 2000s and to boost non-price 
competitiveness. However, the firm-level analysis 
presented in this section suggests that the Greek 
export sector displays some structural features 
that could facilitate this process.  
To better understand the structural features and 
the export potential of the Greek manufacturing 
and service industries, this section presents a 
series of stylised facts emerging from detailed 
industry-level data and firm-level balance sheet 
data. (29) Export structure and dynamics depend 
on the decisions and on the characteristics of 
individual firms. (30) Thus, firm-level analysis 
may be useful because it enables the contribution 
of the extensive margin (how many firms are 
engaged in export activities) to be disentangled 
from that of the intensive margin (which share of 
sales is exported by each firm). The distinction is 
important from a policy perspective because it is 
easier to boost exports by firms already engaged 
                                                        
(27) European Commission, 'The economic adjustment 
programme for Greece. First review – summer 2010', 
European Economy, Occasional Papers, No. 68 (August). 
(28) For an extensive discussion of Greece's external imbalances, 
see Moschovis, G. and M. Capo Servera (2009), ‘External 
imbalances of the Greek economy: the role of fiscal and 
structural policies’, ECFIN Country Focus, Vol. VI, Issue 6. 
(29) Firm-level balance sheet data come from the Bureau Van 
Dijk ORBIS database. 
(30) The recent trade literature has emphasised the marked 
heterogeneity in productivity, size and other economic 
characteristics observed at the level of firms, even within 
narrowly-defined industries. Within an industry, only few 
firms export. Exporters are larger, more productive, and pay 
higher wages than other firms within the same industry. See 
Redding, S. (2010), ‘Theories of heterogeneous firms and 
trade’, CEPR Discussion Paper, No 7961. 
in export activities than by firms that have no 
export experience.  
Low-skill intensive production dominates both 
the manufacturing and the service sectors 
To place the firm-level evidence in the right 
context, the analysis first outlines a series of 
stylised facts of interest that emerge from 
industry-level data for Greece. Industry-level data 
show that the share of manufacturing industries in 
total value added is small especially if compared 
to the share of low-skill intensive services and 
public administration (Graph II.2.1). (31)  
Graph II.2.1: Industry-level distribution of value 
added, Greece  
(2008, % of total excluding agriculture) 
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(31) The industry-level data come from the OECD STAN 
Database for Structural Analysis and the OECD STAN 
Bilateral Trade Database. The data used refer to 2008 
because this is the most recent year for which complete firm-
level balance sheet data are also available.   
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Manufacturing industry contributes only 11 % to 
total value added and almost 19 % to total output. 
Graph II.2.1 shows that the manufacturing 
industries that contribute the most to total value 
added, Food and beverage products (Nace 15) and 
Refined petroleum (Nace 23), together account for 
less than 5 % of value added and less than 8.5 % 
of total output. The rest of the manufacturing 
industries, and notably technology-intensive ones, 
are very small and contribute only marginally to 
total value added. Services sector production 
(70 % of total output and 74 % of value added) is 
more diversified than manufacturing (less skewed 
distribution) but, even in this case, production is 
biased towards low-skill intensive sectors (such as 
Wholesale and Retail trade, Nace 51 and 52, and 
Hotels and restaurants, Nace 55). 
Domestic absorption exceeds domestic 
production for every manufacturing product 
Greece exports in all manufacturing industries. 
But the export distribution in manufacturing does 
not mirror the value added distribution: bigger 
industries contribute less to total manufacturing 
exports than smaller industries. (32) Hence, the 
                                                        
(32) In general, given a country’s specialisation, the industries that 
contribute most to total output (and value added) are also the 
industries where exports are more concentrated (for example 
Italy, with Machinery and Chemicals). This is, however, not 
always true and specialisation in exports and production (or 
value added) may differ due to a range of factors including 
export specialisation of Greece does not fully 
reflect the specialisation in production. 
Table II.2.1 shows that the industries with the 
highest share of manufacturing output (Food 
products and Refined petroleum) only account for 
30 % of manufacturing exports while industries 
such as Textiles and apparel, Basic metals, 
Chemicals and rubber products, Machinery and 
equipment, that together produce only 4.5 % of 
domestic output and 3 % of value added, account 
for almost 50 % of total manufacturing exports. 
Table II.2.1 also shows that all manufacturing 
industries, even the most export-oriented, are net 
importers. The negative Greek trade balance in 
manufacturing is the combination of individual 
industries’ negative balances: domestic absorption 
exceeds domestic production for every 
manufacturing product. 
Firm-level insights: within industries, few big 
firms produce most of the industry output 
Firm-level data show that, within industries, the 
distribution of firm size can be very skewed in 
Greece, with few big firms producing most of the 
industry output. (33) Graph II.2.2 shows the ratios 
                                                                                  
the international fragmentation of production in some 
industries or differences in trade openness across industries. 
(33) Firm-level balance sheet data are collected from the ORBIS 
database and refer to 2008, the latest available year. ORBIS 
is a commercial database compiled by Bureau Van Dijk, 
Netherlands that covers manufacturing and service firms with 
more than € 10 million turnover (operating revenue) 
 
Table II.2.1: Trade in manufacturing, Greece (2008, in %) 
Exports as a share of total 
manufacturing exports
Exports as a share of 
industry production
Domestic production as a 
share of absorption (1)
15 Food products and beverages 14.42 12.10 86.74
16 Tobacco products 1.06 28.19 91.01
17 Textiles 4.80 67.68 61.79
18 Wearing apparel, dressing and dyeing of fur 5.78 51.01 61.93
19 Leather, leather products and footwear 0.61 21.98 34.48
20 Wood and products of wood and cork 0.45 7.37 66.66
21 Pulp, paper and paper products 0.84 11.25 53.53
22 Printing and publishing 0.84 5.17 91.96
23 Coke, refined petroleum products and nucl.fuel 12.59 14.75 93.35
24 Chemicals and chemical products 13.93 49.24 40.63
25 Rubber and plastics products 3.77 30.42 73.96
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 2.87 11.74 89.00
27 Basic metals 15.76 43.95 82.47
28 Fabr. metal products, except machinery and equip. 3.26 10.81 86.56
29 Machinery and equipment, n.e.c. 5.12 39.22 35.41
30 Office, accounting and computing machinery 0.78 1451.10 0.78
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.c. 3.67 25.19 73.30
32 Radio, television and communication equipment 2.17 56.35 25.38
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments 1.17 51.68 19.52
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 1.35 55.37 7.78
35 Other transport equipment 3.45 31.37 37.28
(1) Absorption = Domestic Production + Imports – Exports. 
Source: OECD STAN Bilateral Trade Databases, Commission services. 
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between each industry’s median and mean. Some 
industries have a relatively even distribution of 
employment as the size of the median firm is 
relatively close to the average industry size. Other 
industries, such as Food and beverages or Radio, 
TV and communication equipment, are 
characterised by few big firms and a majority of 
small firms since the size of the median firm is 
much lower than the average firm size of the 
industry. Similar patterns emerge for the service 
industries, where Water transport has a less 
skewed distribution than Retail trade or 
Construction. (34) 
Graph II.2.2: Firm's size distribution, Greece  
(2008, manufacturing industries) (1) 
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(1) Ratio median number of employees over mean number of 
employees, smaller values of the ratio indicate a more skewed 
(concentrated) distribution towards bigger firms; results for 
Leather and footwear (Nace 19), Recycling (Nace 37) and 
Tobacco (Nace 16) are not shown because data for 2008 include 
only a very small number of firms (respectively 5, 3 and 4). 
Source: ORBIS database, Commission services. 
Although most firms in the sample are 
exporters … 
Despite the skewed size distribution, the majority 
of the Greek firms in the sample, and not only the 
biggest, sell at least part of their production 
abroad. Graph II.2.3 shows the share of exporting 
firms for each industry. Particularly for 
                                                                                  
according to the latest balance sheet information available. 
This dataset includes information on firm size, export 
turnover and foreign ownership status for 2 934 firms. 
Overall, these firms represent 63% of total manufacturing 
employment. The selection of companies according to 
turnover makes results more representative for industries 
where small firms are less prevalent. This is the case, for 
instance, of Food processing and Basic metals (where the 
firms in the sample represent more than 90% of the industry's 
employment) but less so of Chemicals or Rubber products 
(where the share falls to 60%) and Textiles and Apparel 
(where the share is 28% and 22% respectively). 
(34) Data not reported here but available upon request. 
manufacturing the evidence contrasts with what 
previous firm-level studies have generally found 
for other countries, where the majority of firms 
are only serving the domestic market and exports 
in each industry are generally accounted for by a 
small group of firms. (35) 
Graph II.2.3: Share of exporting firms, Greece 
(in %, 2008) 
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(1) Manufacturing sector; year: 2008. Results for Leather and 
footwear (NACE 19), Recycling (NACE 37) and Tobacco 
(NACE 16) are not shown because data for 2008 include only a 
very small number of firms (respectively 5, 3 and 4). 
Source: ORBIS database, Commission services. 
… they sell abroad only a small fraction of 
their output 
In most sectors, Greek exporters sell abroad only 
a small fraction of their output (Graph II.2.4). 
This is especially true for industries such as Food 
products and beverages where, on average, each 
firm only exports 30 % of its production. Also big 
firms (size above the average firm size of the 
industry) appear to have low export shares in most 
sectors. Particularly in manufacturing, bigger 
firms do not contribute substantially to the 
industry’s total output exported (Graph II.2.5).  
Hence, contrary to many other countries, 
aggregate exports do not seem to be driven by a 
small number of top exporters. For the entire 
manufacturing sector, the top 5 % exporters 
account for only 53 % of total exports in Greece 
while they contribute 68 % in Italy and about 70 % 
in Spain, Germany and Belgium. (36) (37) 
                                                        
(35) Mayer T. and G. Ottaviano (2007), ‘The happy few: new 
facts on the internationalisation of European firms’, Bruegel-
CEPR Bruegel Blueprint Series, Vol. III. 
(36) Firms occupying the top 5 % positions in terms of export 
turnover. 
(37) Evidence reported in Table 1 of International Study Group on 
Exports and Productivity (2008), ‘Understanding cross-
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However, the pattern is different for services 
where, contrary to manufacturing, the top 5 % 
exporters account for 78 % of total exports. These 
top exporters are often big and foreign-owned. (38) 
Graph II.2.4: Average share of exports in 
production, Greece  
(in%, exporting firms only, 2008) (1) 
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(1) Manufacturing sector; year: 2008; (1) export 
revenue/turnover; Results for Leather and footwear (19), 
Recycling (37) and Tobacco (16) need to be interpreted with 
caution because, in the sample, for 2008, there are only 5, 3 and 4 
firms respectively. 
Source: ORBIS database, Commission services. 
 
Graph II.2.5: Share of total exports of big firms 
by industry (in %) (1) 
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(1) Manufacturing sector; year: 2008; (1) firms above the average 
firm-size of the industry. Results for Leather and footwear 
(NACE 19), Recycling (NACE 37) and Tobacco (NACE 16) are 
not shown because data for 2008 include only a very small 
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Source: ORBIS database, Commission services. 
This substantial presence of marginal exporters, 
especially in manufacturing in Greece, can partly 
                                                                                  
country differences in exporter premia: Comparable evidence 
for 14 countries’ Review of World Economics, 144(4), pp. 
598-635, and in Mayer and Ottaviano (2007); see note 7. 
(38) Data not reported here but available upon request. 
explain the poor past export performance. At the 
same time it suggests potential for future export 
development and growth. Indeed, facing reduced 
domestic demand, firms that have already 
established a commercial presence can expand 
foreign sales through existing distribution 
networks (intensive margin) without having 
necessarily to incur the fixed set-up costs of an 
expansion of sales in new foreign markets 
(extensive margin). Hence, necessary 
improvements in competitiveness, when they take 
place, could boost exports relatively rapidly in 
Greece.   
Conclusions 
The analysis of industry and firm-level data 
highlights some weakness of the Greek productive 
and export system, notably the prevalence of low-
skill intensive industries. However, it also shows 
potential avenues for future export growth. The 
prevalence of marginal exporters explains part of 
the disappointing export performance in 
manufacturing in recent years. However, the fact 
that most firms in the available sample already 
have a commercial presence abroad can be an 
advantage at times when a substantial part of 
domestic output needs to be redirected from 
domestic demand to the export sector: firms with 
a commercial presence can contribute more easily 
and more rapidly to an expansion of exports than 
firms that have never exported. Increasing the 
quantity sold through an already established 
foreign distribution network is much less costly 
than entering new markets because the fixed costs 
in terms of information or distribution networks 
have already been overcome.  
Overall, these results suggest that efforts to 
improve competitiveness or upgrade workers’ 
skills could pay off relatively rapidly in terms of 
boosting Greece’s export performance. In this 
context, it is worth recalling that the medium-term 
objective of the Greece's economic adjustment 
programme is to improve competitiveness and 
alter the economy's structure towards a more 
investment- and export-led growth model. For that 
purpose, the programme includes a wide range of 
ambitious reforms of wage setting mechanisms, 
labour markets and product markets. These 
structural reforms should help to curb undue wage 
pressures and to improve the business  
environment. Important steps forward have 
already been made with the structural reform 
agenda, whereby efforts are expected to intensify 
in the medium term. 
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II.3. House price imbalances in the euro 
area 
Fluctuations in house prices are a defining feature 
of the business cycle. Moreover, housing markets 
have played an important role in the emergence of 
macroeconomic imbalances within the euro area 
since the launch of the euro. (39) Monitoring 
developments in house prices and assessing 
possible imbalances on housing markets is part 
and parcel of the Commission’s macroeconomic 
surveillance process.  
This section presents two methods for quantifying 
the magnitude of house price imbalances that are 
part of the Commission’s surveillance toolbox: 
estimated equations of equilibrium house prices 
and estimates of price-to-rent ratios. Both 
methods have pros and cons and, as they rely on 
different data sets, should be seen as largely 
complementary. 
A strong correction after a long period of price 
increases 
During 1998-2006, real house prices in the euro 
area rose on average by 4 % a year, or by a 
cumulated 45 %. The expansion phase was 
followed by a downward adjustment which started 
at the end of 2007 and reached a cumulated 
decline of 8.3 % by the third quarter of 2009. The 
most pronounced corrections took place in those 
countries that exhibited the strongest house price 
increases previously: Ireland (-37 %), Spain (-
18 %) and France (-15 %). These changes are 
comparable to those observed in the US, although 
with a slight lag. There, real house prices 
increased at an annual rate of 4.5 % between 1998 
and 2006, resulting in a cumulated rise of almost 
50 %, and then decreased by almost 15 % by the 
fourth quarter of 2009. 
In a historical perspective, large movements in 
real house prices are far from exceptional. During 
the previous house price cycle, prices in the euro 
area increased by 30 % between the second 
quarter of 1985 and the third quarter of 1991 and 
then decreased by 9 % over some five years until 
the first quarter of 1997. The current decrease is 
                                                        
(39) See for instance the following two issues of the Quarterly 
Report on the Euro Area: 
Vol. 9, No 1 (2010), ‘Special issue: The impact of the global 
crisis on competitiveness and current account divergences in 
the euro area’ 
Vol. 8, No 1 (2009), ‘Special report: Competitiveness 
developments within the euro area’. 
much sharper nevertheless, because the same 
reduction was realised in only two years.  
Econometric estimates of equilibrium house 
prices  
Equations of equilibrium house prices were 
estimated for seven euro-area countries and two 
non-euro-area countries (see Box I.1 for a detailed 
description of the methodology and the data). The 
estimated equations relate the real house price to 
the following fundamentals: disposable income, 
credit conditions and the tax-adjusted mortgage 
interest rate. For any given point in time, the 
equilibrium house price is taken as the value of 
house prices provided by the equation. It can 
therefore be interpreted as the value of house 
prices that should normally be observed given the 
value of the determinants and the historical 
relationship between house prices and these 
determinants in the country considered. As the 
value of the determinants may change 
significantly over time, so do the estimates of 
equilibrium house prices. (40) 
 
Table II.3.1: House price imbalance and 
adjustment (in %) 
 Country Price misalignments 
(1)
Real price changes betw. 
2008Q4 and 2009Q4
Finland 15 9
France 9 -5
Germany -4 -2
Ireland 3 -19
Italy 8 -3
Netherlands -1 -5
Spain 24 -7
Euro area (median) 8 -5
United Kingdom 18 -2
United States 15 -6
(1) Difference between actual and equilibrium prices in 2008Q4. 
Equilibrium prices are estimated on the basis of estimated 
equations (see Box I.1). Estimates are model-dependent and 
subject to considerable uncertainty. They should therefore be 
interpreted with prudence. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
The first column of Table II.3.1 reports the house 
price misalignment estimates as derived from the 
equation for the fourth quarter of 2008. (41) The 
estimates should be interpreted with prudence as 
they are the result of specific modelling choices 
and subject to significant uncertainty. But, bearing 
these limitations in mind, results indicate that 
                                                        
(40) The determinants may also diverge from their equilibrium 
values. To the extent possible, this divergence is corrected 
when estimating equilibrium house prices. For instance, 
disposable income is adjusted for cyclical fluctuations. 
(41) This is the most recent quarter for which historical data are 
available for the three determinants of house prices. 
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Graph II.3.1: Equilibrium and actual house prices (in logs, base year 2000, 1981Q1 to 2008Q4) 
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house prices were overvalued in all euro-area 
countries except for Germany and the Netherlands 
at the end of 2008. Countries with moderate 
overvaluation (<10 %) included France, Ireland 
and Italy, while larger overvaluation was 
suggested for Finland and Spain. Looking at 
misalignments outside the euro area, house prices 
in the United States and the UK were significantly 
overvalued at the end of 2008, by about 15-20 %. 
This was clearly higher than for the euro area as a 
whole, where the misalignment was below 10 %.  
The second column of Table II.3.1 presents the 
changes in house prices during 2009. Due to 
missing data, estimates of equilibrium house 
prices cannot yet be calculated for that year. 
However, comparing changes in prices in 2009 
with estimates of equilibrium house prices for the 
end of 2008, two country groups can be 
distinguished: converging and diverging 
economies. In the first group (the majority of the 
countries concerned), house prices seem to have 
moved in the direction of reducing past price 
misalignments in 2009. Some Member States, 
such as France and Italy, probably reached a more 
or less balanced price level in the third quarter of 
2009. Spain, however, still showed sizeable 
overvaluation at that time and some countries,  
such as Ireland, may have undershot their 
equilibrium level (i.e. posted house prices that 
were below their equilibrium level). A second 
group of countries, Finland, Germany and the 
Netherlands, showed divergence from the 
equilibrium price level during 2009. House prices 
in Finland actually increased despite signs of 
overvaluation in 2008Q4. This suggests that house 
price developments in Finland merit closer 
attention. In the Netherlands and Germany house 
prices fell from a balanced level or from a slight 
undervaluation position. (42)  
To put recent house price developments in 
perspective, Graph II.3.1 plots the equilibrium 
(solid blue line) against the actual real house 
prices (red dashed line) over the past three 
decades. There is a clear indication that, in most 
countries, house prices rose above their 
equilibrium value around the middle of the decade 
and entered the global economic crisis 
significantly overvalued. There is also a drop in 
equilibrium prices at the end of the sample which 
can be traced back to two variables of the 
estimated model: sluggish developments in  
  
                                                        
(42) It is, however, important to stress that the conclusion rests on 
the assumption that the level equilibrium prices did not 
change in 2009. 
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disposable income and tightening credit 
conditions. These general findings are broadly in 
line with estimates of house price imbalances 
available in the empirical literature. The main 
exception to the general picture is Germany, 
which was characterised by more balanced house 
price developments during the years preceding the 
global economic and financial crisis. The peculiar 
behaviour of equilibrium house price 
developments in Germany is accounted for by a 
very low response of house prices to income in 
the estimated model for Germany. Beyond 
Germany, the estimated equilibrium house prices 
shown in Graph II.3.1 also point to other 
differences across euro-area countries. In the 
Dutch housing market, after a period of 
overvaluation in the late 1990s/early 2000s, house 
prices seem to have undershot their equilibrium 
level during much of the present decade. 
Interestingly, the Netherlands’ fundamentals do 
not seem to have deteriorated markedly after the 
crisis contrary to most of the other countries 
considered. Estimated results also point to 
moderate but stable overvaluation in France and 
Italy in the second part of the 2000s. In Ireland, 
overvaluation appears to have remained relatively 
modest in recent years despite very rapid growth 
in house prices. This finding is explained by the 
fact that the model points to very rapid growth in 
the equilibrium price level during much of the 
2000s on the back of strong growth in household 
disposable income. A rapid and sharp correction 
in prices since 2007 may also have helped to 
mitigate imbalances. Spain is also characterised 
by rapid growth in the estimated equilibrium 
house price during much of the 2000s on the back 
of strong income growth. Hence, despite rapidly 
increasing, house prices appear to have remained 
in line with fundamentals up to the mid-2000s 
before overshooting in more recent years. In 
Finland, the model points to a relatively long 
period of undervaluation in the early part of the 
decade, followed by a period of sizeable 
overvaluation.  
Finally, it is interesting to note that the regression 
results suggest that most countries adjust to price 
misalignment only slowly, halving their 
imbalances in approximately two to four years. 
The exception is Ireland, which adjusts 30 % of its 
price imbalances each quarter. This rapid 
adjustment implies more volatile house prices. 
Price-to-rent ratios 
Price-to-rent ratios are frequently used to evaluate 
periods of house price over- and under-valuation.  
 
Graph II.3.2: Price-to-rent ratio (in logs, base year 2000, 1981Q1 to 2008Q4) 
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Box II.3.1: Estimates of house price misalignments
House price misalignments can be estimated as the differences between equilibrium house prices and actual house 
prices. Equilibrium prices are assessed from the price equation of a reduced-form supply-demand system. This 
reduced form expresses the house price index as a function of disposable income, credit conditions and the tax-
adjusted mortgage interest rate:  
,)ln()/ln( 32it10 ititiitiiiitit emrccypcph ++++= ββββ    (1) 
where t=1,…,T indexes time and i=1,…,N indexes countries, phit denotes the house price index, pcit the consumer 
price index, yit the real disposable income, ccit the credit conditions, mrit the tax-adjusted mortgage interest rate and 
eit the disturbance term. β0i, β1i, β2i, β3i denote the parameters to be estimated. All parameters in (1) are indexed by i 
in order to allow for country differences in the specification of the equation and account for country differences in 
the structure of the housing market. Accordingly (1) is estimated country by country instead of using panel 
regressions. 
While disposable income and the tax-adjusted mortgage rate are directly observable, credit conditions (ccit) are 
unobserved and a proxy has to be used instead. The change in the log of the mortgage stock was chosen as the proxy 
variable, reflecting the acceleration and slowdown in the flow of mortgage credit. This definition captures the 
mortgage credit cycle and therefore the loosening and tightening of credit markets. In order to capture structural 
shifts and to address endogeneity concerns, credit conditions were instrumented by their lagged values and the 
Fraser index when estimating regression (1). 
The specification in (1) differs from housing demand models (for example Muellbauer and Murphy, 1997, Oxford 
Economics 2009) that assume perfectly elastic supply and regress the house price on both quantities and 
fundamentals. By dropping this assumption the specification in (1) acknowledges that based on the available macro 
data structural demand parameters can hardly be identified. This comes at the cost of clarity in interpreting the 
parameters, however, because estimated parameters will contain both supply- and demand-side effects. On the other 
hand it allows (1) to be interpreted as a reduced-form price equation from which equilibrium house prices can be 
predicted directly. The data used in the estimation were collected by Oxford Economics and contain quarterly 
observations from 1970 to the last quarter of 2008. 
Since the price and income series are integrated variables the regression was estimated as a cointegrating 
relationship in an Engle-Granger two-step framework, using a DOLS estimator with one lead and lag. The baseline 
model in (1) had to be fine-tuned in the case of Italy with two modifications. First, the unemployment rate was 
added to the model in order better to capture demand for housing and second, an indicator of building activity was 
also included, in order to control for Italian housing supply fluctuations. The source of the second variable is the 
Commission’s business survey. The parameter estimates for (1) are presented in the table below. Given that these 
are reduced-form parameters their values cannot be interpreted directly as elasticities, although when comparing 
them across countries they provide information on the relative importance of the different fundamentals. An error 
correction model (ECM) corresponding to (1) is estimated as well, in order to estimate the speed of adjustment. The 
lag structure of the ECM was chosen using the BIC criterion. Using the coefficients on the long-term residual as a 
test for cointegration shows that Germany is the only country where cointegration is questionable, most probably 
due to the continuous oversupply of houses since unification. Estimates of the error correction coefficient show 
generally quite slow adjustment: most countries adjust 3 to 7 % of their misalignment in a quarter. The higher end of 
this range, 7 %, implies that it takes two and a half years to reduce imbalances by half. The exception is Ireland, 
which adjusts 30 % of its imbalances each quarter. 
Given the set of parameter estimates b0i, b1i, b2i, b3i the equilibrium price is calculated as: 
,)ln()*/ln( 32
_
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where the bar above the exogenous variables indicates corrected versions of disposable income and credit conditions 
that reflect their long-term trends. The potential disposable income was adjusted to show the same ‘gap’ with respect 
to observed disposable income as between potential GDP and observed GDP. (Similarly the NAIRU rate was used 
instead of the actual unemployment rate in the case of Italy.) Also the instrumented version of credit conditions was 
used. Based on these equilibrium prices the over/undervaluation is expressed in percentage terms, with positive 
values indicating overvaluation: 
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It is therefore useful to compare the cyclical 
deviations of the price-to-rent ratios from their 
long-term trends with the estimates of  
misalignments based on the house price equations 
in order to check whether they point to the same 
conclusion. Graph II.3.2 presents the price-to-rent 
ratio. In all countries, except Germany, price-to-
rent ratios suggest overvaluation in some part of 
the 2000s with actual ratios above their estimated 
long-term trends. Regarding the most recent past, 
Box (continued) 
 
.*)/ln()/ln( itititit pcphpcphntmisalignme −=      (4) 
Several alternative routes for estimating house price misalignments have been used in existing studies. One 
alternative is to base estimates on price-rental ratios (e.g. Girouard, Kennedy, van den Noord and André, 2006; 
André, 2010). Asset pricing theory predicts a clear relation between house prices, rents, and discount rates based on 
the exploitation of arbitrage opportunities between buying and renting houses. This approach nevertheless has 
disadvantages. It only allows imbalances in price-to-rent ratios to be assessed and not imbalances in house prices 
(because only index numbers of price-to-rent ratios are available) and a period has to be assumed when price-to-rent 
ratios were in equilibrium outside the estimation. Moreover, the methodology is well justified only in liquid rental 
and housing markets where arbitrage opportunities can be fully exploited. Another alternative is to estimate 
determinants of house price growth rates (e.g. IMF, 2004). This methodology enables stationary data to be used 
(thus avoiding the difficulties of a cointegration framework) but it means that the computation of house price 
imbalances must be based on assumptions regarding a base period where house prices are not subject to 
misalignment. 
Dependent variable: real house prices (in log) 
 FI FR DE IE IT NL ES UK US 
Log disposable 
income  
1.005*** 
(0.0402) 
1.615***   
(0.0696) 
-0.174*** 
(0.0381) 
1.420*** 
(0.0333) 
3.169*** 
(0.194) 
3.878*** 
(0.0914) 
1.788*** 
(0.0558) 
1.889*** 
(0.0415) 
0.616*** 
(0.0226) 
Credit 
conditions 
2.475*** 
(0.179) 
4.274*** 
(0.294) 
1.932*** 
(0.0911) 
2.049*** 
(0.197) 
0.282*** 
(0.231) 
-0.932*** 
(0.139) 
2.432*** 
(0.407) 
3.723*** 
(0.176) 
1.310*** 
(0.175) 
Tax adjusted 
mortgage rate 
0.0495*** 
(0.00671) 
0.0109** 
(0.00508) 
-0.00650* 
(0.00286) 
0.00360 
(0.00431) 
0.0263*** 
(0.00425) 
0.00570 
(0.00753) 
0.0226*** 
(0.00701) 
-0.0223*** 
(0.00186) 
-0.0199*** 
(0.00272) 
Building activity 
    -0.117* 
(0.0689) 
    
Unemployment 
    -0.0607*** 
(0.00580) 
    
Constant 
-5.472*** 
(0.383) 
-15.53*** 
(0.877) 
5.492*** 
(0.230) 
-9.443*** 
(0.313) 
-33.47*** 
(2.386) 
-10.99*** 
(0.363) 
-16.33*** 
(0.602) 
-18.31*** 
(0.500) 
-0.0276 
(0.168) 
Observations 112 105 109 66 93 65 94 137 137 
R-squared 0.893 0.942 0.811 0.996 0.926 0.985 0.922 0.971 0.924 
(1) Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
Source: Commission services. 
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only Ireland shows a price-to-rent ratio well 
below its long-term trend in the last quarter of 
2008 but the assessment should be considered 
with prudence as the trend rises very steeply and 
appears difficult to estimate in a market which has 
been subject to major structural changes (e.g. 
large swings in immigration flows).  
Most countries (Finland, France, Italy and the 
Netherlands) experienced moderately increasing 
trends in the price-to-rent ratio over the past two 
decades. Except for the Netherlands, price-to-rent 
ratios showed a strong cyclicality around these 
trends: a boom period in the late 1980s was 
followed by a bust in the early 1990s and another 
boom period starting in the early 2000s and 
ending late 2006. Considerable variations in the 
evolution of the trend price-to-rent ratio are worth 
noting outside this group. Spain and Ireland 
experienced much more rapid trend growth than 
other countries while Germany was the only 
country where the price-to-rent ratio actually fell. 
In the US, the price-to-rent ratio showed no clear 
upward trend over the past two decades, but still a 
cyclical pattern with a period of boom starting in 
the early 2000s.  
Overall, the analysis of price-to-rent ratios 
broadly confirms the results of the econometric 
estimates of equilibrium house prices. A word of  
  
caution is, however, necessary in the case of 
Ireland, where significant differences between the 
results of the two methods point to a considerable 
degree of uncertainty regarding the size and sign 
of house price misalignments. 
Conclusion  
This section has presented estimations of 
equilibrium house prices. Such estimations are 
surrounded by significant uncertainty and should 
therefore be interpreted with prudence but they 
suggest that the euro area entered the global 
economic crisis with overvalued house prices. The 
overvaluation was approximately half of that of 
the US at the end of 2008, with the two regions 
experiencing similar price drops during 2009. 
Much of the misalignment now seems to have 
been corrected in the euro area although not in the 
US. The average euro-area picture hides 
significant differences across Member States. By 
the end of 2009, the house-price correction was 
quite advanced in some Member States but still 
had some way to go in others. In addition, a 
couple of Member States, notably Germany, now 
show undervalued house prices. Cyclical 
deviations of price-to-rent ratios from their long-
term trends broadly confirm these econometric 
results. 
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